I found a website called TED. From the website:
The annual conference now brings together the world's most fascinating thinkers and doers, who are challenged to give the talk of their lives (in 18 minutes).
TED has a whole pile of lectures in offering up various radical and innovative ideas. The website is well worth a good look over. One lecture I saw on climate change. In it, the lecturer argues that geo-enegineering is not only completely possible, but cheap and well within out current grasp. While he does advocate emissions reductions, he puts forward the argument that geo-engineering should at least be considered as a viable method of taking imminent actions to stave off imminent climate disasters.
Thursday, December 20, 2007
Tuesday, October 16, 2007
How Will History Treat Sanchez?
On October 12, 2007, retired General Ricardo S. Sanchez made a speech at the Military Reporters and Editors Luncheon. General Sanchez led the coalition as the top military commander from June of 2003 to June of 2004. During his shift, Saddam Hussein's sons, Uday and Qusay were killed, and the second battle of Falujah was fought. Also, the Abu Ghraib defeat occurred.
I traveled to NY city the day he made his speech and heard several reports on the radio and TV. The reports expressed Sanchez's strong criticism of the Bush administration and declared the War as un-windable. I did not have a PC and access to my regular sources of information. To me, a believer in an ultimate military victory in Iraq, Sanchez sounded jaded and bitter.
As a veracious reader of military history, I could imagine future historians treating Sanchez poorly. Historians spend a major portion of their analysis on the leaders that guide the battles. In particular, Civil War historians have dedicated major segments of their discussion to the various Commanders of the Army of the Potomac (AoP). President Lincoln found himself frequently changing Commanders in an effort to defeat Lee's army. Volumes have been written about each commander and how their character and personality contributed to the failure of the AoP. Some of the failed Commanders lived very enigmatic lives after retiring from service. I imagined that a similar pattern would develop for Sanchez--that is, he was one of the many failing Commanders before General Pateaus arrived.
Michael Yon posted Sanchez's complete speech and titled it "Listen Respectfully". I was surprised because in his introduction he encouraged visitors to read the speech with an open mind:
So I read the speech and was surprised to discover that what the radio and TV media presented was but a small piece of what Sanchez had to say. My analysis of the speech reduced Sanchez distertation to four major points:
I traveled to NY city the day he made his speech and heard several reports on the radio and TV. The reports expressed Sanchez's strong criticism of the Bush administration and declared the War as un-windable. I did not have a PC and access to my regular sources of information. To me, a believer in an ultimate military victory in Iraq, Sanchez sounded jaded and bitter.
As a veracious reader of military history, I could imagine future historians treating Sanchez poorly. Historians spend a major portion of their analysis on the leaders that guide the battles. In particular, Civil War historians have dedicated major segments of their discussion to the various Commanders of the Army of the Potomac (AoP). President Lincoln found himself frequently changing Commanders in an effort to defeat Lee's army. Volumes have been written about each commander and how their character and personality contributed to the failure of the AoP. Some of the failed Commanders lived very enigmatic lives after retiring from service. I imagined that a similar pattern would develop for Sanchez--that is, he was one of the many failing Commanders before General Pateaus arrived.
Michael Yon posted Sanchez's complete speech and titled it "Listen Respectfully". I was surprised because in his introduction he encouraged visitors to read the speech with an open mind:
Lieutenant General (Ret.) Ricardo S. Sanchez delivered a public speech yesterday that has been widely picked up in the media, including the New York Times. The thrust of the many articles about his speech tend to focus on LTG (Ret.) Sanchez’ view of the war in Iraq. Some of his current views are a bit dated, but out of respect for a man who served his country for decades, and who clearly is a defender of the United States, it seems just to print his entire speech. Sanchez is a man who should be heard.
This writer disagrees with much of what Sanchez says about the current state of Iraq, but what he says about the media seems spot-on.
So I read the speech and was surprised to discover that what the radio and TV media presented was but a small piece of what Sanchez had to say. My analysis of the speech reduced Sanchez distertation to four major points:
- The journalistic profession is corrupted and without standards, which may contribute to any defeat suffered by the US and its allies.
- The US and its allies lacked a grand strategy to win and it is the responsibility of US political leaders (Legislative as well as Executive leaders) to formulate that strategy.
- Political and inter-agency rivalries threaten American victory in Iraq.
- The US cannot not leave or withdraw from Iraq.
who is responsible for maintaining the ethical standards of the profession in order to ensure that our democracy does not continue to be threatened by this dangerous shift away from your sacred duty of public enlightenment?
The balance of Sanchez's speech discussed the failure of the United States to recognize "tremendous economic and political capacity had to be mobilized, synchronized and applied if we were to achieve victory in a global war." He alluded to the total war footing the US took during WWII as the needed action by the country to win in Iraq and against the Islamic extremists. He was critical of the Bush administration but he was not specific as to what was needed to win beyond total war. He held Congress responsible as well.
How will future historians treat Sanchez? Certainly this speech will be included in their analysis.
Wednesday, October 10, 2007
Military Transformation and the Impact on National Policies
This link points to an interesting article by Major General Alan Peck attempting to describe the USAF's role in COIN warfare. The power in the article emanates more from its existence than from its contents. The essay is not particularly enlightening and appears to be loaded with buzzwords, acronyms, and descriptions of air force capabilities. But the fact that the USAF is actively trying to understand and mold itself to make meaningful contributions to COIN operations is an example of how the US armed forces are transitioning from the cold war to COIN war. General Peck's essay along with other debates underway in the Army exemplify the learning and dynamic nature of the US armed forces.
This morphing of the US's armed forces is intriguing when studied in light of the original neoconservative policy that led to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Recall that the original neocon positioned argued that if the US used its overwhelming military power to overthrow a few despotic rulers, other dictators would fall in line and move toward democracy. Following Saddam's capture, Kadafi's surrender of the Lybian nuclear program provided partial credence that this strategy was affective--that is, until Iraq's slide into a guerrilla and near-civil war, which convinced many observers the US is not capable of executing this strategy. The lightning victory over Saddam's armies indicated the US forces were easily capable of destroying a dictator's conventional forces, but the painful and disastrous guerrilla war that followed proved US occupation and nation building incompetence .
After the Vietnam War defeat, the US successfully avoided major military engagements other than the Cold War until the first Gulf War. The sixteen years between the two wars saw the US briefly involved in only a few military contests and American leaders appeared unwilling to sustain losses. Reagan's withdrawal from Beirut suggested that the US would retreat in the face of a quagmire, which is not a surprise considering the Vietnam experience--and Reagan was a hawk.
All the Democratic Presidential candidates have stated they will not permanently keep troops in Iraq. The top three Republican candidates have always expressed their intent to keep troops in Iraq for years to come. With the military victory in Iraq progressing and becoming more obvious though, the Presidential candidates are expressing a willingness to keep US forces in Iraq for a longer period of time. Hillary has been clearer in her commitment to remain in Iraq for the foreseeable future as ABC reported:
So it is likely the next President will keep troops permanently in Iraq. Much like American troops in Europe and Korea following WWII, their presence will provide the foundation to build a modern indigenous armed forces and eventually a modern government. What will happen if the US successfully transitions Iraq and Afghanistan into free democracies in the same manner as, say, Korea and Malaysia? Will the transformation of the US armed forces to win in Iraq and Afghanistan provide the capability to execute the neocon policy?
The question then becomes, would the nation have the political will to ever undertake an operation like Iraq again? The issue might not be what risks would future American leaders take, but what risks would future despotic leaders take.
This morphing of the US's armed forces is intriguing when studied in light of the original neoconservative policy that led to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Recall that the original neocon positioned argued that if the US used its overwhelming military power to overthrow a few despotic rulers, other dictators would fall in line and move toward democracy. Following Saddam's capture, Kadafi's surrender of the Lybian nuclear program provided partial credence that this strategy was affective--that is, until Iraq's slide into a guerrilla and near-civil war, which convinced many observers the US is not capable of executing this strategy. The lightning victory over Saddam's armies indicated the US forces were easily capable of destroying a dictator's conventional forces, but the painful and disastrous guerrilla war that followed proved US occupation and nation building incompetence .
After the Vietnam War defeat, the US successfully avoided major military engagements other than the Cold War until the first Gulf War. The sixteen years between the two wars saw the US briefly involved in only a few military contests and American leaders appeared unwilling to sustain losses. Reagan's withdrawal from Beirut suggested that the US would retreat in the face of a quagmire, which is not a surprise considering the Vietnam experience--and Reagan was a hawk.
All the Democratic Presidential candidates have stated they will not permanently keep troops in Iraq. The top three Republican candidates have always expressed their intent to keep troops in Iraq for years to come. With the military victory in Iraq progressing and becoming more obvious though, the Presidential candidates are expressing a willingness to keep US forces in Iraq for a longer period of time. Hillary has been clearer in her commitment to remain in Iraq for the foreseeable future as ABC reported:
"I think we have remaining vital national security interests in Iraq” she said, which require the continued presence of American troops.Like a true politician Hillary states a slightly different policy on her website:
Hillary opposes permanent bases in Iraq. She believes we may need a vastly reduced residual force to train Iraqi troops, provide logistical support, and conduct counter terrorism operations. But that is not a permanent force, and she has been clear that she does not plan a permanent occupation.
So it is likely the next President will keep troops permanently in Iraq. Much like American troops in Europe and Korea following WWII, their presence will provide the foundation to build a modern indigenous armed forces and eventually a modern government. What will happen if the US successfully transitions Iraq and Afghanistan into free democracies in the same manner as, say, Korea and Malaysia? Will the transformation of the US armed forces to win in Iraq and Afghanistan provide the capability to execute the neocon policy?
The question then becomes, would the nation have the political will to ever undertake an operation like Iraq again? The issue might not be what risks would future American leaders take, but what risks would future despotic leaders take.
Monday, September 24, 2007
Iran is Gay Free!
When confronted about a question on Iran executing homosexuals, Ahmadinejad response was... well... I think he should speak for himself.
He might not have a bright future as the president of Iran, but maybe the Republicans could give him a PR gig here in the states? Lord knows that they could use all the help they can get.
"In Iran we don't have homosexuals like in your country," Ahmadinejad said to howls and boos among the Columbia University audience.The entire article
"In Iran we do not have this phenomenon, I don't know who has told you that we have it," he said.
Ahmadinejad was challenged during his appearance on Amnesty International figures that suggested that 200 people had been executed in Iran so far this year, among them homosexuals.
He might not have a bright future as the president of Iran, but maybe the Republicans could give him a PR gig here in the states? Lord knows that they could use all the help they can get.
Saturday, September 22, 2007
Post-General Patraeus
Now that General Patraeus and Ambassador Crocker have delivered their assessments of the Iraqi war situation, I feel compelled, in the face of the noisy and rancorous public discourse, to add to the din. My motivations are driven primarily by the difference that I see between my views and the cacophony of other commentators. I have not read or heard of any opinion similar to mine. And since the Belcher Blog is designed to capture the ideas and views of participants at the time of the events, without the benefits of hindsight and history, I will expose my thoughts and make predictions about the future.
Before I begin, I recognize the dangerous territory that I am about to enter. Using historical and current events to predict the future is precarious and, as Nassim Taleb warned in the Black Swan, should be avoided (see my August 9, 2007 post Posts from the Past). Furthermore, I recognize that I have a bias toward victory. There is no doubt that my research and forecasts suffer from confirmation bias. With that in mind, I will qualify my predictions; these are the course of events that I see occurring provided no black swan events occur.
I will start with a parallel in history.
I feel that we are witnessing a substantial military victory comparable to the breakout of Allied forces from the Normandy peninsula in operation Cobra. Though Hitler’s National Socialist Germany was vastly more dangerous than Bin Ladin’s Islamic revolution—evident in the dramatic differences in lives lost—the relative significance of the two events appear similar to me. In the case of Cobra, Allied forces had fought a series of critical battles and amassed enough forces to break out of the difficult terrain blocking the Normandy peninsula. Following Cobra, the German Army in France would be encircled, captured, and its remnants driven back to the Siegfried line. The surviving German forces were barely able to mount a desperate yet doomed counterattack in the Battle of the Bulge five months later.
At this time in Iraq, the American “Surge” forces have arrived, deployed into key neighborhoods in Baghdad, and launched a series of offensive operations in the suburbs and rural communities surrounding the capitol. Army tactics changed as they moved from traditional warfare to counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare practices. At the same time, the Marines have managed an unexpected and surprising victory in al Anbar province by convincing key tribal leaders to abandon support for al Qaeda and to support the national government instead. Iraqi national army forces and local police are fully engaged in the effort and providing important combat forces despite their unsteady performance earlier in the war.
General Patraeus substantiated his position that the Surge was a success with ample charts and graphs showing quantifiable evidence of improvement. Various commentators either supported or challenged his data, or pointed the weak progress on part of the central civilian government as proof that his assessment was wrong. My intent is not to go through the numbers, but to point to some general patterns in the events that give rise to evidence of an emerging victory.
First, my impression that victory is at hand is the “Tribal Awakening”. This massed switching of sides by Sunni irregular forces in al Anbar province, once the site of the fiercest battles in the war, is clearly a victory for the Coalition forces. This change of events was only possible because the Marines, despite gleeful reports by some in the mass media of atrocities, fought a well executed counterinsurgency war against Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). In the end, the tribal leaders recognized that they were better off supporting the national government and the Coalition forces than supporting AQI. This was only possible because the Marines clearly understood and properly executed effective counterinsurgency warfare tactics. At the same time it appears that AQI failed to follow some of Mao’s most fundamental practices and principles and alienated the population.
Defeat of the AQI in predominately Sunni regions will interrupt the cycle of violence that led many observers to believe a sectarian civil war was underway. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi initiated the cycle by attacking Shia religions targets, which, in turn, resulted in retaliation against Sunni targets by Shia militia. The number two leader of Al Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, wrote a letter to al-Zarqawi in July 2005 warning him not to undertake attacks against fellow Muslims (the letter was intercepted by Coalition forces and an exerpt is at the end of this post). As AQI is forced out of their current sanctuaries by Coalition forces and the unfriendly Sunni population, they will become more vulnerable. The Shia regions will prove unsafe for AQI. Once AQI is defeated, then the cycle of violence will diminish and likelihood of a sectarian civil war abated.
Many observers of the War in Iraq do not understand the effectiveness of proper counterinsurgency warfare tactics. US military leaders worked desperately hard to bring these tactics to their regular forces. I listened to Lt. Col Nagl interviewed on Book Notes where he described the creation and deployment of the COIN manual to US forces, which arrived in 2006. Modern Western forces have successfully won COIN wars in recent history: in Malaysia in the 1950s and against the Viet Cong in the late 1960's. The patterns of operations are very similar.
Creation of a national government: Without a national government, the citizens of the country will find it difficult to form an allegiance with groups other than the insurgent groups. It is important that the government is not seen as corrupt and unjust. The national government needs to provide a rallying point for the population. In Iraq the rallying point might be the idea of a unified, yet diverse, Arab country (surveys report that 75% of Iraqis wish Iraq to remain a single nation-state).
Leveraging of local sources of power. In Vietnam this was the village and in Malaysia it was the Chinese labor camps. In Iraq it is the tribe and the “Awaking of the Tribes” in al Anbar supports this concept.
Creation of national security forces. Civilians are more likely to support the national government if security is provided by trustworthy and friendly local forces. Besides, foriegn nations cannot provide enough troops to meet the citizen to security personnel needed to protect the population.
Focus on the safety of the civilian population. The key to successful COIN is to convince individuals that their situation is improved by allying with the national government rather than with the insurgents. Insurgents need to intimidate civilians to some degree if they wish to remain safely anonymous within the population. So the movement of Coalition forces from the large, well protected main bases into the streets provides the protection that convinces the population that the national government has their safety in mind.
Absorption of militias into regular security forces. This allows the national government to influence and contain militia action and to install new leadership into these groups. It also sets the flow of pay and money up from local sources to the national government.
Successful efforts to improve the well-being of civilian population. Projects funded by the national government that effectively improve the lives of the general population demonstrate that the central government is better able to meet their needs than the insurgents.
Slowly these patterns of military operations will swing the population against Al Qaeda and make it dangerous for them to operate in Iraq. I am not predicting the complete collapse of AQI, but I do expect their level of operations to diminish substantially. A change in AQI tactics or targets will provide evidence that current Coalition operations are effective and that AQI needs a new strategy to survive. The question is how long will it take the leadership of AQI to adapt and for the change to become evident. How adaptive is AQI? Al-Zarqawi’s decision to attack Shia civilian targets and create a sectarian civil war at first appeared successful until Coalition forces changed tactics with a switch to COIN operations and focused on the protection of the civilian population.
What could undermine this promising picture of victory? Widespread corruption that leads the majority of individuals to believe the ruling government is unjust could be detrimental. I believe that for the foreseeable future the citizens of Iraq will accept current levels of corruptions in exchange for security and a sense of peace. I suspect Saddam immunized the population to corruption to some degree. Exposure to Western style governmental practices and the US armed forces should help move the government toward a more transparent and just organization. Watchful waiting by the international community and provincial surveillance should keep sectarian injustices by the central governmental to a minimum.
What black swan incident could change the course of events. I don’t think an assassination of Nouri al-Maliki, Muqtada al-Sadr, or Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani would lead to collapse of the increasingly positive Coalition situation. I believe none of these leaders are particularly critical to the success of the new democratic government the way that, say, Ghandi or Tutu was to movements in their countries. I think just the opposite is possible, that a leader could emerge from the current situation who could play a uniting role in the country the way these other great men did. This tumultuous period in Iraqi modern history, overcoming the autocratic regime of Saddam, dealing with the Coalition occupation, fighting against al-Qaeda, and forming of a modern government, is no doubt, creating impressive leadership somewhere in the sinews of competing forces. Is it possible that there is an Iraqi tribal leader, mayor, or military commander who has demonstrated ability to unit and lead diverse groups? Could this individual eventually come to power in some way? Israel, post-war Germany, and Meiji-period Japan persevered because of the outstanding leadership of a few key people who recognized the direction the nation had to go to become great powers again.
A massacre could be a devastating black swan event. Imagine a security force brutally killing nearly everyone in a village or neighborhood. It could be an irregular but sanctioned security force, like the 1920 Brigade that Michael Yon writes about, or a regular military unit in the Iraqi National Army. Either way, it could act as a divisive occurrence that weakens citizen support for the government.
But if a black swan event does not derail the current course of the war, an amazing victory is unfolding in Iraq. I wonder why the major media and their legions of commentators—note that I avoided the word “experts”—have not recognized it. If my observations and conclusions are accurate, the United States is defeating Al Qaeda in an Arab nation directly in the center of the Middle East.
The next observation indicating an acceptance of a Western style democracy in Iraq is a change in the view that the media expresses toward the Coalition, or a switch in the Arab press toward the Iraqi government. The first evidence that I observed was the following article from Al Jazeera. The article describes the response by the citizenry to the AQI killing of Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, the tribal leader responsible of the “Tribal Awakening”.
Thousands of people gathered in Ramadi on Friday to attend Abu Risha's funeral.
"We blame al-Qaeda and we are going to continue our fight and avenge his death," Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, brother of Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, said on Friday.
Ahmed Abu Risha was elected the new leader of the Anbar Salvation Conference just hours after his brother's killing.
Pallbearers carried Abdul Sattar Abu Risha's body from Ramadi to the cemetery 10km outside the city, while the funeral procession shouted "revenge, revenge on al-Qaeda."
Others mourners chanted "there is no God but Allah and al-Qaeda is the enemy of Allah" and "Abdul Sattar is the pride of Ramadi".
Nuri al-Maliki, the Iraqi prime minister, was represented by Muwaffaq al-Rubaie, his national security adviser, who condemned the killing.
"It is a national Iraqi disaster. What Abu Risha did for Iraq, no single man has done in the country's history," al-Rubaie told the mourners gathered in the sheikh's house.
"We will support Anbar much more than before. Abu Risha is a national hero."
The primary voices arguing against an American victory are those that point to the poor progress made on the political side of the war. Ambassador Crocker responded to these criticisms by pointing out the Iraqi government is struggling with difficult decisions, such as the strength of the national government versus the provincial and city governments. He pointed to our own historical difficulties with this question. Most critics claim that the war cannot be won without a political victory. I, on the other hand, feel that political progress is not needed for a victory. I do feel, though, that a military victory is needed for political progress. Once the competing groups in Iraq realize that they cannot achieve their goals through violent means, they will be more inclined to politically negotiate in good faith. I would not be surprised that the current group of Iraqi politicians might not be able to make decent progress before the next election. Considering our own political situation, that would put them in the same place as our Congress.
It is unfortunate that humanity seems to lurch forward through violent conflicts. Though Bin Laden might have gotten his wish when he hoped for a conflict in the Middle East with the US, I doubt he anticipated that his warriors would loose in that contest.
Below is the portion of the letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri (number two Al Qaeda) to al-Zarqawi (AQI leader) in July 2005 that describes al-Zawahiri’s concerns about provoking a sectarian civil war.
E) We must repeat what we mentioned previously, that the majority of Muslims don't comprehend this and possibly could not even imagine it. For that reason, many of your Muslim admirers amongst the common folk are wondering about your attacks on the Shia. The sharpness of this questioning increases when the attacks are on one of their mosques, and it increases more when the attacks are on the mausoleum of Imam Ali Bin Abi Talib, may God honor him. My opinion is that this matter won't be acceptable to the Muslim populace however much you have tried to explain it, and aversion to this will continue.
Indeed, questions will circulate among mujahedeen circles and their opinion makers about the correctness of this conflict with the Shia at this time. Is it something that is unavoidable? Or, is it something can be put off until the force of the mujahed movement in Iraq gets stronger? And if some of the operations were necessary for self-defense, were all of the operations necessary? Or, were there some operations that weren't called for? And is the opening of another front now in addition to the front against the Americans and the government a wise decision? Or, does this conflict with the Shia lift the burden from the Americans by diverting the mujahedeen to the Shia, while the Americans continue to control matters from afar? And if the attacks on Shia leaders were necessary to put a stop to their plans, then why were there attacks on ordinary Shia? Won't this lead to reinforcing false ideas in their minds, even as it is incumbent on us to preach the call of Islam to them and explain and communicate to guide them to the truth? And can the mujahedeen kill all of the Shia in Iraq? Has any Islamic state in history ever tried that? And why kill
ordinary Shia considering that they are forgiven because of their ignorance? And
what loss will befall us if we did not attack the Shia? And do the brothers forget that we have more than one hundred prisoners - many of whom are from the leadership who are wanted in their countries - in the custody of the Iranians? And even if we attack the Shia out of necessity, then why do you announce this matter and make it public, which compels the Iranians to take counter measures? And do the brothers forget that both we and the Iranians need to refrain from harming each other at this time in which the Americans are targeting us?
Wednesday, September 12, 2007
Review: America's Secret War : Inside the Hidden Worldwide truggle Between America and Its Enemies
I finished up listening to America’s Secret War today. I honestly can’t offer a complete review because the audio format that I used left a huge gaping hole in my take on the book. Notably, I don’t know what sort of foot notes the author was using. This is a pretty crucial point, especially as you reach the later points in the book. It will become clear why as I give my review on America’s Secret War, by George Friedman.
Consider this book a history lesson. The history lesson starts some time around the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and runs right up to the date that the book was published (late 2004). What sets this book’s perspective apart from other perspectives is that finds intention and motive in everything. Every single news headline is really a feint or thrust by one power or another, motives are rarely what they seem, everyone practices realpolitik, and conspiracies are abound. If there is a weakness to the book, it is that at times the voice that describes the thinking of all sides speaks with such authority as to leave one skeptical of the analysis. It is one thing to state potential motivations and for a particular action, but to claim in a certain and authoritative voice that one nation or group did something for one reason or another comes off as overconfident at times. The story that is told is coherent and makes sense in the view of the world Friedman has taken, but buying Friedman’s world view might be hard for some to do (and I include myself in this camp). Footnotes might help resolve some of my skepticism, but some assertions are so bold that there is little that could shake my skepticism.
That said, don’t let Friedman’s apparent overconfidence that he understands that truth of the world dissuade you entirely from this book. For every over confident assertion of one entity’s motives, there is another very believable and plausible perspective brought to the table that is enlightening. In particular, Friedman picks apart al-Qaeda’s origins and motivations and offers up a plausible strategy that al-Qaeda could be following that expands well beyond Giuliani’s “they hate our freedom” analysis. Not only does Friedman offer up a compelling description of al-Qaeda and its motives, he offers up evidence to support his claims. Unlike later in the book when he talks about post 9/11 politicking, his pre-9/11 assertions seem sound and mostly supported.
If there is one real failing of this book, beyond the questionable authoritative assertions of each parties actions, it is that Friedman starts to lose the thread of his original claim near the end of the book. Friedman originally makes the compelling claims that al-Qaeda had a goal and a plan to enact a pan-Islamic caliphate, and that provoking the Americans was al-Qaeda’s attempt to unite the Islamic world in revolution. Friedman’s analysis fails near the end of the book when he devolves from talking about al-Qaeda’s motives and strategy, to focusing on al-Qaeda’s tactics. He seems to imply that al-Qaeda wants to launch future attacks on the US, but fails to explain how this would advance al-Qaeda’s cause. He starts to make the same mistake that most people make and focus on tactics instead of grand overarching goals and strategy. The book begs for an analysis of al-Qaeda’s post 9/11 actions in the context of their overarching goals, but for the most part fails to do so. That said, a wise reader can easily come to his own conclusions.
I do suggest reading this book, but qualify this recommendation suggesting that you read it with skepticism. If nothing else, the world view presented in this book is unique and coherent, if impossible to prove at times. Beyond the interesting world view, the book offers up some very solid analysis of al-Qaeda’s rise and goals pre-9/11. The description of the American foreign policy maneuvers taken in response to 9/11 might leave you skeptical, but it is, if nothing else, entertaining and perhaps even plausible.
Consider this book a history lesson. The history lesson starts some time around the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and runs right up to the date that the book was published (late 2004). What sets this book’s perspective apart from other perspectives is that finds intention and motive in everything. Every single news headline is really a feint or thrust by one power or another, motives are rarely what they seem, everyone practices realpolitik, and conspiracies are abound. If there is a weakness to the book, it is that at times the voice that describes the thinking of all sides speaks with such authority as to leave one skeptical of the analysis. It is one thing to state potential motivations and for a particular action, but to claim in a certain and authoritative voice that one nation or group did something for one reason or another comes off as overconfident at times. The story that is told is coherent and makes sense in the view of the world Friedman has taken, but buying Friedman’s world view might be hard for some to do (and I include myself in this camp). Footnotes might help resolve some of my skepticism, but some assertions are so bold that there is little that could shake my skepticism.
That said, don’t let Friedman’s apparent overconfidence that he understands that truth of the world dissuade you entirely from this book. For every over confident assertion of one entity’s motives, there is another very believable and plausible perspective brought to the table that is enlightening. In particular, Friedman picks apart al-Qaeda’s origins and motivations and offers up a plausible strategy that al-Qaeda could be following that expands well beyond Giuliani’s “they hate our freedom” analysis. Not only does Friedman offer up a compelling description of al-Qaeda and its motives, he offers up evidence to support his claims. Unlike later in the book when he talks about post 9/11 politicking, his pre-9/11 assertions seem sound and mostly supported.
If there is one real failing of this book, beyond the questionable authoritative assertions of each parties actions, it is that Friedman starts to lose the thread of his original claim near the end of the book. Friedman originally makes the compelling claims that al-Qaeda had a goal and a plan to enact a pan-Islamic caliphate, and that provoking the Americans was al-Qaeda’s attempt to unite the Islamic world in revolution. Friedman’s analysis fails near the end of the book when he devolves from talking about al-Qaeda’s motives and strategy, to focusing on al-Qaeda’s tactics. He seems to imply that al-Qaeda wants to launch future attacks on the US, but fails to explain how this would advance al-Qaeda’s cause. He starts to make the same mistake that most people make and focus on tactics instead of grand overarching goals and strategy. The book begs for an analysis of al-Qaeda’s post 9/11 actions in the context of their overarching goals, but for the most part fails to do so. That said, a wise reader can easily come to his own conclusions.
I do suggest reading this book, but qualify this recommendation suggesting that you read it with skepticism. If nothing else, the world view presented in this book is unique and coherent, if impossible to prove at times. Beyond the interesting world view, the book offers up some very solid analysis of al-Qaeda’s rise and goals pre-9/11. The description of the American foreign policy maneuvers taken in response to 9/11 might leave you skeptical, but it is, if nothing else, entertaining and perhaps even plausible.
I Have To Read This Book!
Wow! I must read this book. Jon's review was very intriguing and has pricked my interest. Understanding the motivation of one's opponent is key to winning. As the ancient Sun Tzu said in the Art of War:
I am curious--is the reason that Al Qaeda has not attacked the US at home is that it would strengthen our resolve to continue the fight in Iraq? After reading Jon's review of the book, it appears that the opponents to the war and the "bring the troops home now" crowd are actually playing into Al Qaeda's goals.
So it is said that if you know your enemies and know yourself, you will win a hundred times in a hundred battles.
If you only know yourself, but not your opponent, you win one and lose the next.
If you do not know yourself or your enemy, you will always lose.
I am curious--is the reason that Al Qaeda has not attacked the US at home is that it would strengthen our resolve to continue the fight in Iraq? After reading Jon's review of the book, it appears that the opponents to the war and the "bring the troops home now" crowd are actually playing into Al Qaeda's goals.
Tuesday, September 11, 2007
Terrorism for the Sane
I am currently reading (well, actually listening too) a book called “America's Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle Between America and Its Enemies”. The book details the origins of al-Qaeda, the roots of the Taliban, the lead up to 9/11, and tries to give explanations and motivations behind each faction’s actions. There are a lot of points that could be discussed in reference to the book, but perhaps the most profound for me was the dissection of al-Qaeda’s motives.
There is a fundamental question that one needs to ask when pondering the motivations behind al-Qaeda’s actions is; are all al-Qaeda’s actions rational? Does al-Qaeda have a goal that it is trying to achieve in a rational way? Put another way, is al-Qaeda acting more like Chinese Maoist rebels, or more like Timothy McVeigh. Maoist rebels had a goal and used rational means to achieve it. Timothy McVeigh, while certainly having a goal, was completely delusional to think that blowing up the Oklahoma City building was going to achieve his ends. This is an important question, as it frames how to deal with al-Qaeda. Handling a religious suicide cult is much different from handling an organization trying to achieve its goal in a rational way.
George Friedman, author of America’s Secret War, argues that al-Qaeda is a rational organization with an achievable goal. Friedman categorically rejects simplistic “they hate our freedom” and “they want to make use Muslims” arguments. Instead, he argues that al-Qaeda wants to achieve a united Islamist caliphate that spans across the entire Islamic world. He argues that for al-Qaeda, the failure of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a defining moment. Al-Qaeda looked upon the Soviet defeat and thought that they saw a strategy for rebuilding and Islamic empire.
The Soviets poured hundreds of thousands of men into the blood bath of Afghanistan and were resoundingly defeated. A handful of poorly armed but highly motivated rebels were able to defeat the largest military in the world on its own border. To al-Qaeda, this was proof enough that force of will alone could expel foreign influences, topple corrupt and secular Islamic governments, and beat back overseas interventions.
Al-Qaeda’s rational goal with 9/11, according to Friedman, was to provoke the Americans into involving themselves militarily in multiple Islamic nations. The goal was two fold. First, al-Qaeda wanted unite the Islamic world by provoking the Americans into invading Islamic nations. It was al-Qaeda’s belief, that if the Americans were seen to be crusading against Islamic nations, the long victimized feeling people of the Islamic world would unite to defeat a common foe. Al-Qaeda’s second goal in provoking the Americans was to spawn an American defeat. It was al-Qaeda’s belief that the Islamic world felt impotent against the western world, and that this feeling of impotence is what kept them from striking forward and rebuilding the Islamic empire. By provoking the Americans into Soviet Afghanistan style defeat, al-Qaeda hoped to show the Islamic world the impotence of the Americans, and by extension the impotence of the governments that the Americans supported.
Al-Qaeda than has been thwarted both by their miscalculations and the active steps taken by the Americans. The invasion of Afghanistan in particular with its ‘light’ footprint never became the blood bath that al-Qaeda had hoped for. The pan Islamic uprising never occurred as either the governments of Islamic nations showed themselves to be more stable than al-Qaeda anticipated, or their citizens less enraged by American actions than they had hoped.
Even Iraq, which certainly still could become the “proof” of American impotence, has turned out to be far less than al-Qaeda had hoped. Instead of an Islamic uprising against the Americans, we instead see sectarian strife that has as much to do with inter-Islamic disunity than it has to do with resistance to American occupation.
Regardless if Friedman’s analysis is correct, his argument underlined for me that we spend very little time trying to actually understand al-Qaeda’s motives and instead rely on policy debate that revolves around cheap clichés like “they hate our freedom”. Al-Qaeda needs to be viewed as an organization that is rational and does things for rational reasons. Perhaps we might be better served to view al-Qaeda as being more like Maoist rebels with rational means and ends, than a crazy suicide cult that can’t be blocked (short of killing all its members) because it has no rational goal or method of achieving it.
There is a fundamental question that one needs to ask when pondering the motivations behind al-Qaeda’s actions is; are all al-Qaeda’s actions rational? Does al-Qaeda have a goal that it is trying to achieve in a rational way? Put another way, is al-Qaeda acting more like Chinese Maoist rebels, or more like Timothy McVeigh. Maoist rebels had a goal and used rational means to achieve it. Timothy McVeigh, while certainly having a goal, was completely delusional to think that blowing up the Oklahoma City building was going to achieve his ends. This is an important question, as it frames how to deal with al-Qaeda. Handling a religious suicide cult is much different from handling an organization trying to achieve its goal in a rational way.
George Friedman, author of America’s Secret War, argues that al-Qaeda is a rational organization with an achievable goal. Friedman categorically rejects simplistic “they hate our freedom” and “they want to make use Muslims” arguments. Instead, he argues that al-Qaeda wants to achieve a united Islamist caliphate that spans across the entire Islamic world. He argues that for al-Qaeda, the failure of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a defining moment. Al-Qaeda looked upon the Soviet defeat and thought that they saw a strategy for rebuilding and Islamic empire.
The Soviets poured hundreds of thousands of men into the blood bath of Afghanistan and were resoundingly defeated. A handful of poorly armed but highly motivated rebels were able to defeat the largest military in the world on its own border. To al-Qaeda, this was proof enough that force of will alone could expel foreign influences, topple corrupt and secular Islamic governments, and beat back overseas interventions.
Al-Qaeda’s rational goal with 9/11, according to Friedman, was to provoke the Americans into involving themselves militarily in multiple Islamic nations. The goal was two fold. First, al-Qaeda wanted unite the Islamic world by provoking the Americans into invading Islamic nations. It was al-Qaeda’s belief, that if the Americans were seen to be crusading against Islamic nations, the long victimized feeling people of the Islamic world would unite to defeat a common foe. Al-Qaeda’s second goal in provoking the Americans was to spawn an American defeat. It was al-Qaeda’s belief that the Islamic world felt impotent against the western world, and that this feeling of impotence is what kept them from striking forward and rebuilding the Islamic empire. By provoking the Americans into Soviet Afghanistan style defeat, al-Qaeda hoped to show the Islamic world the impotence of the Americans, and by extension the impotence of the governments that the Americans supported.
Al-Qaeda than has been thwarted both by their miscalculations and the active steps taken by the Americans. The invasion of Afghanistan in particular with its ‘light’ footprint never became the blood bath that al-Qaeda had hoped for. The pan Islamic uprising never occurred as either the governments of Islamic nations showed themselves to be more stable than al-Qaeda anticipated, or their citizens less enraged by American actions than they had hoped.
Even Iraq, which certainly still could become the “proof” of American impotence, has turned out to be far less than al-Qaeda had hoped. Instead of an Islamic uprising against the Americans, we instead see sectarian strife that has as much to do with inter-Islamic disunity than it has to do with resistance to American occupation.
Regardless if Friedman’s analysis is correct, his argument underlined for me that we spend very little time trying to actually understand al-Qaeda’s motives and instead rely on policy debate that revolves around cheap clichés like “they hate our freedom”. Al-Qaeda needs to be viewed as an organization that is rational and does things for rational reasons. Perhaps we might be better served to view al-Qaeda as being more like Maoist rebels with rational means and ends, than a crazy suicide cult that can’t be blocked (short of killing all its members) because it has no rational goal or method of achieving it.
Friday, September 7, 2007
Enjoy but Beware
Regression is an impressive analytical technique that works well where natural laws reliability and consistently influences the topic under study. In my field of engineering, regression analysis and their resulting models are phenomenally successful in analyzing and predicting outcomes. We use regression and models to automatically target processes and to uncover problems. We have recently worked with some supplier firms that will take all the data and measurements collected during the production processes to create self-correcting models that would keep product in spec.
I feel, though, that the technique is over used in financial markets. Armies of statisticians and economist have worked to create predictive models to explain markets, all to no avail. Certainly they have been lured by stories of models that can predict Supreme Court decisions. Talib, the author of Black Swan and Fooled by Randomness, has been very critical of regression analysis on social science topics. Any enthusiast of regression must read his book to understand the limitations of the technique.
But because you work in the physicals science and engineering fields, thoroughly learn the techniques and enjoy the fruits of prediction. To be the best in one’s field, though, take the time to try to explain the fundamental science principles that influence the outcome and give the models validity.
I feel, though, that the technique is over used in financial markets. Armies of statisticians and economist have worked to create predictive models to explain markets, all to no avail. Certainly they have been lured by stories of models that can predict Supreme Court decisions. Talib, the author of Black Swan and Fooled by Randomness, has been very critical of regression analysis on social science topics. Any enthusiast of regression must read his book to understand the limitations of the technique.
But because you work in the physicals science and engineering fields, thoroughly learn the techniques and enjoy the fruits of prediction. To be the best in one’s field, though, take the time to try to explain the fundamental science principles that influence the outcome and give the models validity.
Wednesday, September 5, 2007
Man Vs Regression
I have been slinking my way through a new book, Super Crunchers. While the book itself has not sent down any truly illuminating beams of light from the heavens for me, it has brought to illumination a few interesting tidbits.
The basic premise is that statistical experimentation and data mining represents a massive leap in our ability to predict. For anyone already knows a thing or two about regressions and how they are used, the book weaves its way through some predictable examples of statistically driven models outdoing the best judgment of experts. Where the book really starts to shine is when it puts the light on some more unusual cases of data crunching that resulted in superior predictive results.
One of the more notable examples given is when a simple multivariate regression taking into account just six factors was able to out predict a team of 80+ political science and law experts when deciding how the Supreme Court would vote on various cases. To add insult to injury, the experts only gave their opinion when it dealt with the field that they were working in. A simple formula was able to out predict a small army of experts in what most would consider to be a very humanistic field.
This "Regression Vs The Law and Political Experts" example is not an isolated incident. In a survey of some 120+ academic studies built around experts competing with a multivariate regression over a vast range of topics, it was found that in only 8 cases did the experts defeat the regression.
As a user of regression analysis, this has got me thinking about where I can apply this sort of statistical thinking that reaches beyond the limited engineering optimization experiments that I normally engage in. One example brought up in Super Crunchers of particular interest to me was when a statistician with minimal knowledge of businesses put his multi-variate regression up against expert buyers for a particular company. He found that his regression was vastly superior in predicting if and when an order would be filled, and if it would come in on budget. While I have little desire (yet) to look at how the company I work for, Ballard, does its buying, it does call to question if other non-engineering aspects of my job might not be served by a regression analysis.
Most notably, I wonder if projecting project completion times might not benefit from the cold and object analysis that a statistical approach can bring. If there is one theme that Super Crunchers brings up constantly, it is that humans tend to make poorer decisions when presented with more variables and more emotional attachment. Something like project projection times fits both conditions for begging for poor human judgment. That isn't to say that human judgment needs to be removed, just that predicative capability might be improved if human judgment is just one variable to consider when making a prediction, instead of being the only variable. By letting human judgment be a factor in a regression, you can take into account factors that might be over look, while at the same time leaving the final decision out of human hands.
Super Crunchers has not exactly brought me any new and profound enlightenment, but it has opened my eyes a little to both the accuracy of a statical evidence based approach and to the breadth of areas it can be used in.
The basic premise is that statistical experimentation and data mining represents a massive leap in our ability to predict. For anyone already knows a thing or two about regressions and how they are used, the book weaves its way through some predictable examples of statistically driven models outdoing the best judgment of experts. Where the book really starts to shine is when it puts the light on some more unusual cases of data crunching that resulted in superior predictive results.
One of the more notable examples given is when a simple multivariate regression taking into account just six factors was able to out predict a team of 80+ political science and law experts when deciding how the Supreme Court would vote on various cases. To add insult to injury, the experts only gave their opinion when it dealt with the field that they were working in. A simple formula was able to out predict a small army of experts in what most would consider to be a very humanistic field.
This "Regression Vs The Law and Political Experts" example is not an isolated incident. In a survey of some 120+ academic studies built around experts competing with a multivariate regression over a vast range of topics, it was found that in only 8 cases did the experts defeat the regression.
As a user of regression analysis, this has got me thinking about where I can apply this sort of statistical thinking that reaches beyond the limited engineering optimization experiments that I normally engage in. One example brought up in Super Crunchers of particular interest to me was when a statistician with minimal knowledge of businesses put his multi-variate regression up against expert buyers for a particular company. He found that his regression was vastly superior in predicting if and when an order would be filled, and if it would come in on budget. While I have little desire (yet) to look at how the company I work for, Ballard, does its buying, it does call to question if other non-engineering aspects of my job might not be served by a regression analysis.
Most notably, I wonder if projecting project completion times might not benefit from the cold and object analysis that a statistical approach can bring. If there is one theme that Super Crunchers brings up constantly, it is that humans tend to make poorer decisions when presented with more variables and more emotional attachment. Something like project projection times fits both conditions for begging for poor human judgment. That isn't to say that human judgment needs to be removed, just that predicative capability might be improved if human judgment is just one variable to consider when making a prediction, instead of being the only variable. By letting human judgment be a factor in a regression, you can take into account factors that might be over look, while at the same time leaving the final decision out of human hands.
Super Crunchers has not exactly brought me any new and profound enlightenment, but it has opened my eyes a little to both the accuracy of a statical evidence based approach and to the breadth of areas it can be used in.
Tuesday, August 21, 2007
Iraq Trip Sways Democrat Congressman Against Pullout
U.S. Rep. Brian Baird (D-WA) returned last week from a second trip to Iraq. He voted against authorizing the invasion of Iraq in 2002, and in May, he voted in favor of Democratic legislation that would have required President Bush to bring U.S. troops home next year.But after his recent visit, Baird has changed his mind. He now says he believes U.S. troops must stay in Iraq longer, and that a precipitous withdrawal could have catastrophic results for Iraq and the region.
I heard this article while I was on my way to work and was a little surprised by it. The article summarizing the interview has a link to listen to the entire interview (which is worth a listen).
Online Video Game Gets an Economist
I found this article rather neat. An online game with a functional economy and a few tens of thousands of people online at a time ended up hiring an economist to fix financial woes within the game. Despite having perfect data and control over the game's markets (outside of what users did of course), the company managing the game suffered multiple economic disasters within the game. The economic disasters, much like in the real world, resulted in unhappy people. Unlike in the real world, unhappy players were able to simply stop paying their $15 / month and go play somewhere else. They hope that an economist armed with perfect data and a strong hand to manipulate supply and demand will be able to offer up a more stable in game market.
"We think Milton Friedman would definitely like this," CCP Chief Executive Hilmar Petursson said, referring to the American economist best known for his theory that money supply ultimately drives the boom and bust of the business cycle.
Guodmundsson is also looking into whether lessons learned in running a virtual economy can apply to real-world ones. It's a rich field that is drawing interest since experiments that would be impossible in real life can be arranged with a few software tweaks.
"We watch price bubbles happen in Eve Online. We are thus able to watch in rapid fashion, a mathematical simulation of those price bubbles. We then are in a position to extrapolate price bubbles in the real world and trade on that, in futures or whatnot," Petursson said.
Saturday, August 11, 2007
This is a letter between a socialist friend and opponent of the war. We discussed a claim made by David M. Kennedy, a professor of history at Stanford and the author of the Pulitzer-Prize winning "Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945," is working on a book about the American national character. My response is in blue italics and took place in July 2005.
Hello BillKennedy makes a couple of excellent points that I have been promoting for along time (though not as eloquently as Mr. Kennedy):
"The implications are deeply unsettling: history's most potent military forcecan now be put into the field by a society that scarcely breaks a sweat when it does so [Remember that the USA is 28% of the world's GNP and 10% of its population, a level not reached by any society in history except possibly China at the end of the 18th century and the British at the end of the 19th century. An occupation of a nation that is economically equal to North Dakota and physically equal to Texas is not tough]. We can now wage war while putting at risk very few of our sons and daughters, none of whom is obliged to serve [What a wonderful achievement, kind of like growing cotton without slaves]. Modern warfare lays no significant burdens on the larger body of citizens in whose name war is being waged." [If we were to wage war on any of our contemporaries like the EU or Japan (rather than North Dakota), it might be necessary for the USA to resort the brutal practices of the past, like conscription and attacks aimed at civilian targets like factories and refineries. Fortunately, our contemporaries have followed the same path to prosperity that the USA has--free market democracy--so such practices will never need to be used again]. "Leaving questions of equity aside [Is Senator Kennedy implying that a voluntary armed forces is unequal?], it cannot be wise for a democracy to let such an important function grow so far removed from popular participation and accountability [Our form of government, which is composed of popularly elected politicians, decides on the use of our armed forces]. It makes some supremely important things too easy - like dealing out death and destruction to others, and seeking military solutions on the assumption they will be swifter and more cheaply bought than what could be accomplished by the more vexatious business of diplomacy. [The use of force by free-market democracies is an action of last resort that typically follows substantial public debate. All the major uses of force, in my voting life-time, were preceded--and sometimes succeeded--by public and political wrangling and discourse. On the other hand, can you think of any situations were regular forces were not used because public debate prevented it.......Nicaragua, Cuba, Lebanon, Iran.]
"I've long advocated that we should only draft white men over 40 making $80K/year or more (include other races and women if you want, but they need to be economically advantaged). It's not fair to have the middle class and upper classes benefit from America's world domination by sending our lower (economic) class to fight our battles. It's too easy because these people are too"expendable". Follow my draft strategy and we'd have a lot less wars. What do you think?
I disagree with Senator Kennedy "too easy" claim. I think that our nation does debate and wrestle with the use of force and that the politicians are held accountable. I assume you agree that folks in the armed forces are already held accountable for the use of force since you advocate forcing "advantaged" people into the military (i.e. drafting wealthy 40+ year old males). I also disagree with your claim that a lower economic class goes to war. Our armed forces are not disproportionately made up of the "lower economic class". Where do you get that idea? Remember, 95% of all officers in the armed forces have baccalaureate college degree (with 45% having advanced degrees) and officers make up more than 12% (my guess) of the armed forces. Because of the entrance requirements, armed forces members have greater high school graduation rates and higher average scores on aptitude tests than the civilian population. Only the black minority group is over represented in the armed forces (22% military vs. 14% civilian) while women and Hispanics are under represented. All but women are proportionately represented (to the general population) in the officer corp. The all volunteer military has successfully eliminated the injustices and disproportions experienced with the draft military.
It is hard for some people to believe that for many in the Armed Forces, membership was a first and not a last choice. I think part of the issue that Kennedy is experiencing is that he does not understand why the general population is not raising up in protest over the violence that is occurring in Iraq and Afghanistan. He remembers the public protest during the Vietnam War and probably believes that if the draft was in place then people would protest the war. Many people believe that popular protests ended the Vietnam War and that a similar movement should be occurring today. Where are rallies, the protests, the marches, and the veterans against the war?
I hear several explanations for why a popular protest against the war has not occurred. The most common excuse I hear is that the media is not presenting what is truly happening in Iraq and Afghanistan—that is, the embedded reporter is biased. This thinking follows that if the American public knew what was truly happening, protests would erupt. The other is this “too easy” argument that Senator Kennedy has presented.
I believe the reason that protests have not occurred is because the US military has been successful in Iraq and Afghanistan where as in Vietnam they were not. The goal of the weaker force in an asymmetrical war like Vietnam and the Middle East is to inflict enough losses on the bigger force to encourage them to negotiate an end to hostilities or to leave. The goal of the bigger force is to prevent the losses and create local allies that will force the smaller force out. The North Vietnamese were successful in their efforts and the US military failed in theirs in Vietnam. If the US forces in Vietnam had successfully isolated the South from the North in 1965 or 1966, the war protests would never have occurred because 55,000 Americans would never have died. The US was successful in Korea and Taiwan in isolating the Communist from their local Allies and thus those nations prospered. South Vietnam probably would have turned out the same way if the US had been willing to build a massive wall (like the Iron Curtain, Berlin Wall, or Korean DMZ) around South Vietnam, a strategy easily within the US’s capability (and one the Israelis are pursuing today).
Moreover, America’s local allies are making significant progress toward establishing a viable government in Iraq. In several years the Iraqi National Forces will be quite powerful, the Americans and their allies will be gone, and the country will be busy achieving the same miracles that the South Koreans and Taiwanese have achieved.
Thursday, August 9, 2007
The Winner's Curse
Here is a letter to my brother James on April 7, 2004, about the time the first battle of Fallujah was taking place. I titled it at the time as The Winner's Curse.
Hello James:
Yes I did get your response and I thought it was very insightful. I posed the “What country best describes…” question at work to several of my colleagues at lunch and got the following response:
3 Balkans
1 Vietnam
2 Turkey
Personally, I don’t know how this is going to turn out. In my view, this is one of those events in history where the passage of time is needed to provide perspective. I hope that Turkey is the final outcome in a 3 to 5 year timeframe and I see only Vietnam as a defeat. In fact, I would consider a Balkan through to Pakistan as acceptable outcomes. Let me explain it this way.
We are experiencing the “Winner’s Curse” in Iraq—that is, the difficulties associated with being the winner. Uprisings, insurgents, and the frustrations of trying to build a stable consensual government in a region of the world that is inherently unstable are difficulties that we face. It has a cost in terms of money, lives, and diverted resources. What alternative do we have? In Iraq, we probably have none. We cannot leave because our opponents would certainly take over and kill any friends that we have made. Plus our military power would be seen as a façade in the face of weak political and social resolve.
History will someday answer a fundamental question, “Is it possible for the US to build a democracy in the Muslim or Arab world?” Right now it does not look promising. I can only hope that we are winning a great military and strategic victory in this current wave of violence and that our opponents will be too weak to mount a major campaign again. Then we can get down to the business of building a nation.
If we are not capable of building democracies in this part of the world, and this is another failed attempt like Vietnam, then what course of action should we take? How should we use our immense power to protect ourselves against the Fundamentalist until their people experience their own Enlightenment?
One possibility is to let them win so that they experience the winners curse. Consider this, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Iran have reacted to our display of power even though they are our opponents. In a sense, the Neoconservative Bully Plan appears to be working (the bully plan is that we bully one or two nations and the others in the region fall in line). The reason the others fall into line is because their leaders appreciate their positions of luxury, power, and authority and do not wish to give it up in the face of American soldiers ransacking their palaces. Additionally, these nations do not want to be erroneously invaded because evidence from a terror attack against the West leads back to their country.
So if organized governments are fearful of American invasion and our new strategy of focusing on the political and military leaders, why don’t we us it to our advantage. Well organized, carefully planned, and direct military invasions by American armed forces work to our strengths and always leads to the destruction of our opponents’ armies and governments. We appear to have a problem after we defeat the government and armies and attempt to build a nation. Maybe we should just avoid the nation building. Maybe we should achieve the destruction of the enemy government and armed forces, and then withdraw, leaving the region to fester in its own turmoil. No doubt that any theocracy or dictatorship has its own internal enemies, and after its armies are destroyed, they will then be burdened with reasserting their power and position.
Let’s take Syria as an example. Suppose we approached the Syrians on ending the supply of insurgents into Iraq and destabilizing the region. Imagine we told them to stop or we would invade and destroy their palaces, government buildings, and army. We would arm their enemies and then we would leave. Survivors could pick up the pieces. I think Bashar al-Assad of Syria prefers his current position to hiding and running from American aircraft and AFVs. Just an armored thrust across the desert towards Damascus might be enough for him to tell his negotiators to assent to American demands. Particularly if we have made it clear to the world that we are not there to “rebuild” Syria, simply change its anti-American policies and throw terrorist out.
If indeed it is not possible for the US to build democracies in the Arab or Muslim world, then I think this is the only policy that we can take. If Vietnam is the likely outcome for Iraq, we should evacuate our friends and allies, and retreat to the Kurdish regions.
I think this current period of violence is actually an accident. I believe the bad guys were planning an offensive sometime in the summer to interrupt the elections in America, and that shutting down the paper, fingering Sadr as a criminal, and the grisly death of Americans in Fulluja was unexpected. The offensive by Sadr’s followers and the Marine invasion of Fulluja, I hope, interrupted their plans and has thrown them off guard. Hopefully we will inflict enough casualties to deter future violence and a government can be formed. The big question is “Is an attack on the US planned (like Spain), and if it is successful, how will American respond to the violence in Iraq?”
Take care,
Bill
Posts from the Past
Recently I completed an intriguing book by Nassim Taleb titled The Black Swans: Impact of the Highly Improbable. Taleb describes black swans as rare and unexpected events that are extremely consequential yet are explainable by experts after they have occurred. He points out that the experts rarely predict the event in time to take action before the event has occurred. The term black swans comes from the original European idea that black swans did not exist because they had only experienced white swans--that is, until explorers found Australia. The American Statistician journal is featuring Taleb's book in their August edition (I am a member of the American Statistical Association). I look forward to their analysis.
A point that Talib makes in his book is that we lack the ability to make predictions based on the data at hand, especially in regards to history and how it unfolds. To make his point he describes how William Shirer, the definitive author who wrote The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, also published his diary covering the period from 1934 to 1941 when Shirer was a journalist in Europe. Taleb points out that the diary in no way clearly predicts that a massive event like WWII was unfolding.
With that in mind, I thought I would publish on this blog some of the observations and predictions that I was making as the War in Iraq was unfolding. In effect, I have chosen to expose my failed attempts to predict the future about the war on this blog. Throughout the course of the War in Iraq I wrote several letters and essays but kept the writings to myself. I did clearly express my views as any reader that has spent time with me will see as they read the material. There are five or six works and I will post them over time with their creation date.
A point that Talib makes in his book is that we lack the ability to make predictions based on the data at hand, especially in regards to history and how it unfolds. To make his point he describes how William Shirer, the definitive author who wrote The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, also published his diary covering the period from 1934 to 1941 when Shirer was a journalist in Europe. Taleb points out that the diary in no way clearly predicts that a massive event like WWII was unfolding.
With that in mind, I thought I would publish on this blog some of the observations and predictions that I was making as the War in Iraq was unfolding. In effect, I have chosen to expose my failed attempts to predict the future about the war on this blog. Throughout the course of the War in Iraq I wrote several letters and essays but kept the writings to myself. I did clearly express my views as any reader that has spent time with me will see as they read the material. There are five or six works and I will post them over time with their creation date.
Monday, July 16, 2007
Tuesday, June 19, 2007
Invisible Bookshelf
There is a website known as Lifehacker that is generally full of interesting odds and ends. The website is tech centric, but it likes to touch on other non-tech ideas. One thing that I found very amusing was instruction on how to construct a very convincing "invisible bookshelf".
Friday, June 15, 2007
The Baroque Cycle
So I finally plowed my way through an awesome 3000 page epic. The series is called The Baroque Cycle, written by Neal Stephenson. I have read many of Neal's books and been delighted by all of them. Even when his witting is not science fiction, it is written for geeks. The Baroque Cycle in this case is set right around the dawn of the 18th century and for the most part employs no science fiction or fantasy except in one very small area. The series is long and I would generally be at a loss to give a good explanation of the series that doesn't devolve into an incoherent rambled retelling of the various plot lines and characters that would do the books no justice. Fortunately, The Weekly Standard has done the work for me with this book review.
I would highly recommend this book, but I am slightly skeptical anyone in the family has the time and will to plow through 3000 pages besides me. If you would like a slightly lighter read by Neal Stephenson (though still weighing in at around 1000 pages), I would highly recommend Cryptonomicon.
I would highly recommend this book, but I am slightly skeptical anyone in the family has the time and will to plow through 3000 pages besides me. If you would like a slightly lighter read by Neal Stephenson (though still weighing in at around 1000 pages), I would highly recommend Cryptonomicon.
Tuesday, June 5, 2007
Tax Cuts
BY PETE DU PONT Thursday, May 24, 2007 12:01 a.m.
The hottest domestic political issue of the coming two years will be federal income taxes.
The Democratic Party is for a big tax increase, via repeal of the Bush tax cuts. Its three major presidential candidates are for it (Hillary Clinton and John Edwards voted against the 2003 Bush tax cuts and Barack Obama against their extension). House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid are for it. Bill Clinton is for it because he believes the 2003 Bush tax cuts were "way too big to avoid serious harm." And the party's newspaper, the New York Times, is for it, stating that the 2003 tax cuts were "economically unsound" and would "increase the deficit by hundreds of billions of dollars."
Republicans, arguing that the 2003 tax cuts have helped the economy grow, created jobs, increased federal tax revenues, and thus reduced federal deficits, are mostly against raising tax rates.
So what are the facts? Did the tax rate reductions of the Bush administration spur or diminish economic growth? Grow or diminish federal tax revenues? Were they good or bad economic policy?
Economic indicators show that since the 2003 tax cuts the GDP has grown an inflation-adjusted average of 3.3% a year, and eight million new jobs have been created over 44 consecutive months of job growth. Unemployment has fallen 25%, from 6.1% to 4.5%, with strong declines across all ethnic groups. Productivity growth has expanded 2.8% a year since 2001, outstripping the past three decades' average. So according to all these economic indices, the 2003 tax cuts have strengthened the American economy.
The tax cuts have also produced substantial tax revenue increases--14.5% growth in 2005 and 11.7% in 2006. For the first seven months of the current fiscal year, total revenues were up 11.3% over last year, and individual income tax receipts were up by 17.5%. Total tax receipts in April were $70 billion higher than in April 2006.
The Congressional Budget Office and the Congressional Joint Tax Commission estimated that a reduction in the capital gains rate to 15% from 20%, which was passed in 2003, would cost the U.S. Treasury some $5.4 billion over three years. But actual revenues exceeded expectations by $133 billion, so the government profited substantially from our strong economy and the tax rate reduction. In fact, the tax cuts have actually expanded revenues as a percentage of gross domestic product. Over the past 40 years, federal tax receipts have accounted for 18.3% of GDP. That figure was 18.4% in 2006, and the CBO projects it at 18.6% in the current fiscal year.
These revenue increases have also had a positive impact on the federal deficit. Since the 2003 tax cuts the deficit has declined from $413 billion (3.5% of GDP) in fiscal 2004, to $318 billion in 2005, then $248 billion in 2006, and an estimated $150 billion to $200 billion (1.1% to 1.5% of GDP) in the current fiscal year.
Lower tax rates have also produced another important economic change: fewer and shorter recessions. As economist Brian Westbury noted in the Wall Street Journal last month, in "the high-tax, highly regulated years between 1969 and 1982 the economy was in recession 32% of the time. Since then, following Ronald Reagan's tax cuts, and deregulation . . . the U.S. economy has only been in recession 5% of the time."
So Bill Clinton and the New York Times have it backwards; there was serious economic improvement, rather than harm, produced by the tax cuts, and the deficit decreased rather than increased. The truth is that tax rate reductions have been good for the American economy and the American people.
With these facts in front of it, what does the new Democratic Congressional majority plan to do? Why, of course, raise income tax rates so that they can expand the size, scope, and reach of government, never mind that tax increases will slow the economy and reduce job growth. The Pelosi-Reid majority plans to do it now, and it will surely be done again if there is a liberal Democrat in the White House two years from now.
If House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Charles Rangel has his way, the Congress will increase taxes on the wealthy and enact tax reductions for the middle class by raising the threshold for taxpayers subject to the alternative minimum tax.
The AMT was enacted in 1969 to raise taxes on the wealthiest people, but since it was not indexed to inflation it impacts a large group of middle class families. While only 100 or so wealthy people were affeced in its first year, three million people were within the scope of the AMT in 2006, and unless Congress does something, 25 million may be liable this year. Mr. Rangel's plan would exempt families making less than $250,000 per year (98% of taxpayers) from the AMT
But that would be expensive--reducing revenues by around $50 billion a year, according to an analysis by the Tax Policy Center. Under the House "pay as you go" rule, tax cuts must be "paid for" by other tax increases or spending cuts, so if the Congress were running $50 billion annual shortfalls as a result of the Rangel tax cuts, where would the money to balance the budget come from? From the top 2% of taxpayers. Mr. Rangel proposes to raise the top AMT rate for those making more than $500,000 to 31.5% from 28%, and the capital gains and dividend rates for people subject to the AMT to 31.5% from 15%.
Mr. Rangel has economic policy backward. instead of looking for higher tax rates to raise the money to pay for some AMT elimination and add and expand government programs, it would be better to reduce spending to cover the necessary $50 billion per year-- less than 2% of the federal government's nearly $3 trillion in annual spending.
Imposing punishing tax rates to fund increased spending would suffocate investment and ultimately slow the cash machine that provides the needed federal revenues. With such a tax policy American people of every economic strata will no longer enjoy the benefits of an expanding economy, because that economy will be slowly spiraling into decline.
Mr. du Pont, a former governor of Delaware, is chairman of the Dallas-based National Center for Policy Analysis. His column appears once a month.
Copyright © 2007 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
The hottest domestic political issue of the coming two years will be federal income taxes.
The Democratic Party is for a big tax increase, via repeal of the Bush tax cuts. Its three major presidential candidates are for it (Hillary Clinton and John Edwards voted against the 2003 Bush tax cuts and Barack Obama against their extension). House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid are for it. Bill Clinton is for it because he believes the 2003 Bush tax cuts were "way too big to avoid serious harm." And the party's newspaper, the New York Times, is for it, stating that the 2003 tax cuts were "economically unsound" and would "increase the deficit by hundreds of billions of dollars."
Republicans, arguing that the 2003 tax cuts have helped the economy grow, created jobs, increased federal tax revenues, and thus reduced federal deficits, are mostly against raising tax rates.
So what are the facts? Did the tax rate reductions of the Bush administration spur or diminish economic growth? Grow or diminish federal tax revenues? Were they good or bad economic policy?
Economic indicators show that since the 2003 tax cuts the GDP has grown an inflation-adjusted average of 3.3% a year, and eight million new jobs have been created over 44 consecutive months of job growth. Unemployment has fallen 25%, from 6.1% to 4.5%, with strong declines across all ethnic groups. Productivity growth has expanded 2.8% a year since 2001, outstripping the past three decades' average. So according to all these economic indices, the 2003 tax cuts have strengthened the American economy.
The tax cuts have also produced substantial tax revenue increases--14.5% growth in 2005 and 11.7% in 2006. For the first seven months of the current fiscal year, total revenues were up 11.3% over last year, and individual income tax receipts were up by 17.5%. Total tax receipts in April were $70 billion higher than in April 2006.
The Congressional Budget Office and the Congressional Joint Tax Commission estimated that a reduction in the capital gains rate to 15% from 20%, which was passed in 2003, would cost the U.S. Treasury some $5.4 billion over three years. But actual revenues exceeded expectations by $133 billion, so the government profited substantially from our strong economy and the tax rate reduction. In fact, the tax cuts have actually expanded revenues as a percentage of gross domestic product. Over the past 40 years, federal tax receipts have accounted for 18.3% of GDP. That figure was 18.4% in 2006, and the CBO projects it at 18.6% in the current fiscal year.
These revenue increases have also had a positive impact on the federal deficit. Since the 2003 tax cuts the deficit has declined from $413 billion (3.5% of GDP) in fiscal 2004, to $318 billion in 2005, then $248 billion in 2006, and an estimated $150 billion to $200 billion (1.1% to 1.5% of GDP) in the current fiscal year.
Lower tax rates have also produced another important economic change: fewer and shorter recessions. As economist Brian Westbury noted in the Wall Street Journal last month, in "the high-tax, highly regulated years between 1969 and 1982 the economy was in recession 32% of the time. Since then, following Ronald Reagan's tax cuts, and deregulation . . . the U.S. economy has only been in recession 5% of the time."
So Bill Clinton and the New York Times have it backwards; there was serious economic improvement, rather than harm, produced by the tax cuts, and the deficit decreased rather than increased. The truth is that tax rate reductions have been good for the American economy and the American people.
With these facts in front of it, what does the new Democratic Congressional majority plan to do? Why, of course, raise income tax rates so that they can expand the size, scope, and reach of government, never mind that tax increases will slow the economy and reduce job growth. The Pelosi-Reid majority plans to do it now, and it will surely be done again if there is a liberal Democrat in the White House two years from now.
If House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Charles Rangel has his way, the Congress will increase taxes on the wealthy and enact tax reductions for the middle class by raising the threshold for taxpayers subject to the alternative minimum tax.
The AMT was enacted in 1969 to raise taxes on the wealthiest people, but since it was not indexed to inflation it impacts a large group of middle class families. While only 100 or so wealthy people were affeced in its first year, three million people were within the scope of the AMT in 2006, and unless Congress does something, 25 million may be liable this year. Mr. Rangel's plan would exempt families making less than $250,000 per year (98% of taxpayers) from the AMT
But that would be expensive--reducing revenues by around $50 billion a year, according to an analysis by the Tax Policy Center. Under the House "pay as you go" rule, tax cuts must be "paid for" by other tax increases or spending cuts, so if the Congress were running $50 billion annual shortfalls as a result of the Rangel tax cuts, where would the money to balance the budget come from? From the top 2% of taxpayers. Mr. Rangel proposes to raise the top AMT rate for those making more than $500,000 to 31.5% from 28%, and the capital gains and dividend rates for people subject to the AMT to 31.5% from 15%.
Mr. Rangel has economic policy backward. instead of looking for higher tax rates to raise the money to pay for some AMT elimination and add and expand government programs, it would be better to reduce spending to cover the necessary $50 billion per year-- less than 2% of the federal government's nearly $3 trillion in annual spending.
Imposing punishing tax rates to fund increased spending would suffocate investment and ultimately slow the cash machine that provides the needed federal revenues. With such a tax policy American people of every economic strata will no longer enjoy the benefits of an expanding economy, because that economy will be slowly spiraling into decline.
Mr. du Pont, a former governor of Delaware, is chairman of the Dallas-based National Center for Policy Analysis. His column appears once a month.
Copyright © 2007 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Wednesday, May 30, 2007
What Motivates the US and Iran
Interesting stuff. It appears as though the US is attempting to gain some leverage by going on the offensive (clanestine) against the Iranian governement. If it produces some degree of pressure, then the Iranian's might be interested in a negotiated cease fire in Iraq. I cannot imagine that the US has the ability to covertly pressure the Iranian government and that such an effort would produce helpful results.
Tuesday, May 29, 2007
Perspective on Iranian Diplomacy
Just wanted to drop this article before I headed off to work. It is from an outside of Iran Iranian newspaper with an interesting perspective on the diplomacy efforts currently happening between Iran and the US over Iraq.
Sunday, May 27, 2007
Readings
Currently I am reading Japan Rising-the Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose by Kenneth Pyle. I was drawn to this book by a podcast interview of the author (CATO I think hosted it) . He also recently feature an editorial in the Wall Street Journal. I am about one third of the way through the book and have uncovered some very interesting perspectives, not only of Japan, but also of how countries manage their international relationships in general. This is definitely turning out to be a profound book which will change my perspective of Japan and Asia.
Headed to Maine
Just a quick note, I am headed to Maine next week. I'll be in Boston on Thursday (05/31/07) and probably hang out there overnight. I'll come into Maine Friday night with Anne and hit a friends wedding on Saturday night. After shooing Anne back to Chicago on Sunday, I'll be in Maine until 06/13/07.
What this is
My original thought with this blog was to have a place where me and Dad could toss up interesting articles and thoughts, not as a public service to everyone, but as a way for us to communicate and archive what we are thinking. As I thought on it more, I realized that this blog could potentially do more. Mom might want to toss up pictures from a vacation and Arianna might want to drop a note that she will be in Maine for the weekend. As I mulled over the idea even further, I realized that perhaps Dad might want to post an article, show it to Uncle Jimmy, or even show it to someone outside of the family.
I have settled on a quasi-open forum and I will let it evolve where it wants to. I have dropped invitations for editing rights to everyone in my nuclear family and a few others. If anyone else wants rights to drop a post onto this blog, just give me a call or drop em an e-mail. Anyone is free to post what they want, but keep in mind that for now this is an open site that anyone on the Internet can reach. I have made no attempt to get this blog listed so I doubt it will suffer much traffic, but I advise against posting anything you wouldn't want seen in public.
I personally will use this blog to keep everyone up to date with what I am doing, drop interesting articles, post up thoughts I have had, and maybe toss up a picture or two. I invite anyone else to use this forum however they see fit.
edited: Anne found my use of "throw up" to be abhorrent, so I have edited all the "throw up" to "toss up". Maybe she will love me now.
I have settled on a quasi-open forum and I will let it evolve where it wants to. I have dropped invitations for editing rights to everyone in my nuclear family and a few others. If anyone else wants rights to drop a post onto this blog, just give me a call or drop em an e-mail. Anyone is free to post what they want, but keep in mind that for now this is an open site that anyone on the Internet can reach. I have made no attempt to get this blog listed so I doubt it will suffer much traffic, but I advise against posting anything you wouldn't want seen in public.
I personally will use this blog to keep everyone up to date with what I am doing, drop interesting articles, post up thoughts I have had, and maybe toss up a picture or two. I invite anyone else to use this forum however they see fit.
edited: Anne found my use of "throw up" to be abhorrent, so I have edited all the "throw up" to "toss up". Maybe she will love me now.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)