How Will History Treat Sanchez?

On October 12, 2007, retired General Ricardo S. Sanchez made a speech at the Military Reporters and Editors Luncheon. General Sanchez led the coalition as the top military commander from June of 2003 to June of 2004. During his shift, Saddam Hussein's sons, Uday and Qusay were killed, and the second battle of Falujah was fought. Also, the Abu Ghraib defeat occurred.

I traveled to NY city the day he made his speech and heard several reports on the radio and TV. The reports expressed Sanchez's strong criticism of the Bush administration and declared the War as un-windable. I did not have a PC and access to my regular sources of information. To me, a believer in an ultimate military victory in Iraq, Sanchez sounded jaded and bitter.

As a veracious reader of military history, I could imagine future historians treating Sanchez poorly. Historians spend a major portion of their analysis on the leaders that guide the battles. In particular, Civil War historians have dedicated major segments of their discussion to the various Commanders of the Army of the Potomac (AoP). President Lincoln found himself frequently changing Commanders in an effort to defeat Lee's army. Volumes have been written about each commander and how their character and personality contributed to the failure of the AoP. Some of the failed Commanders lived very enigmatic lives after retiring from service. I imagined that a similar pattern would develop for Sanchez--that is, he was one of the many failing Commanders before General Pateaus arrived.

Michael Yon posted Sanchez's complete speech and titled it "Listen Respectfully". I was surprised because in his introduction he encouraged visitors to read the speech with an open mind:

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Ricardo S. Sanchez delivered a public speech yesterday that has been widely picked up in the media, including the New York Times. The thrust of the many articles about his speech tend to focus on LTG (Ret.) Sanchez’ view of the war in Iraq. Some of his current views are a bit dated, but out of respect for a man who served his country for decades, and who clearly is a defender of the United States, it seems just to print his entire speech. Sanchez is a man who should be heard.

This writer disagrees with much of what Sanchez says about the current state of Iraq, but what he says about the media seems spot-on.

So I read the speech and was surprised to discover that what the radio and TV media presented was but a small piece of what Sanchez had to say. My analysis of the speech reduced Sanchez distertation to four major points:

1. The journalistic profession is corrupted and without standards, which may contribute to any defeat suffered by the US and its allies.
2. The US and its allies lacked a grand strategy to win and it is the responsibility of US political leaders (Legislative as well as Executive leaders) to formulate that strategy.
3. Political and inter-agency rivalries threaten American victory in Iraq.
4. The US cannot not leave or withdraw from Iraq.

Wow! How could this be? Of 3409 words in his speech, 1369 were devoted to criticism of the press yet I heard not a word in the four days of media reporting and analysis. One third of the speech was a well thought out discussion about the role of a free press during war. I think Sanchez summed it up well with the following question:

who is responsible for maintaining the ethical standards of the profession in order to ensure that our democracy does not continue to be threatened by this dangerous shift away from your sacred duty of public enlightenment?

The balance of Sanchez's speech discussed the failure of the United States to recognize "tremendous economic and political capacity had to be mobilized, synchronized and applied if we were to achieve victory in a global war." He alluded to the total war footing the US took during WWII as the needed action by the country to win in Iraq and against the Islamic extremists. He was critical of the Bush administration but he was not specific as to what was needed to win beyond total war. He held Congress responsible as well.

How will future historians treat Sanchez? Certainly this speech will be included in their analysis.

Military Transformation and the Impact on National Policies

This link points to an interesting article by Major General Alan Peck attempting to describe the USAF's role in COIN warfare. The power in the article emanates more from its existence than from its contents. The essay is not particularly enlightening and appears to be loaded with buzzwords, acronyms, and descriptions of air force capabilities. But the fact that the USAF is actively trying to understand and mold itself to make meaningful contributions to COIN operations is an example of how the US armed forces are transitioning from the cold war to COIN war. General Peck's essay along with other debates underway in the Army exemplify the learning and dynamic nature of the US armed forces.

This morphing of the US's armed forces is intriguing when studied in light of the original neoconservative policy that led to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Recall that the original neocon positioned argued that if the US used its overwhelming military power to overthrow a few despotic rulers, other dictators would fall in line and move toward democracy. Following Saddam's capture, Kadafi's surrender of the Lybian nuclear program provided partial credence that this strategy was affective--that is, until Iraq's slide into a guerrilla and near-civil war, which convinced many observers the US is not capable of executing this strategy. The lightning victory over Saddam's armies indicated the US forces were easily capable of destroying a dictator's conventional forces, but the painful and disastrous guerrilla war that followed proved US occupation and nation building incompetence .

After the Vietnam War defeat, the US successfully avoided major military engagements other than the Cold War until the first Gulf War. The sixteen years between the two wars saw the US briefly involved in only a few military contests and American leaders appeared unwilling to sustain losses. Reagan's withdrawal from Beirut suggested that the US would retreat in the face of a quagmire, which is not a surprise considering the Vietnam experience--and Reagan was a hawk.

All the Democratic Presidential candidates have stated they will not permanently keep troops in Iraq. The top three Republican candidates have always expressed their intent to keep troops in Iraq for years to come. With the military victory in Iraq progressing and becoming more obvious though, the Presidential candidates are expressing a willingness to keep US forces in Iraq for a longer period of time. Hillary has been clearer in her commitment to remain in Iraq for the foreseeable future as ABC reported:

"I think we have remaining vital national security interests in Iraq” she said, which require the continued presence of American troops.

Like a true politician Hillary states a slightly different policy on her website:

Hillary opposes permanent bases in Iraq. She believes we may need a vastly reduced residual force to train Iraqi troops, provide logistical support, and conduct counter terrorism operations. But that is not a permanent force, and she has been clear that she does not plan a permanent occupation.

So it is likely the next President will keep troops permanently in Iraq. Much like American troops in Europe and Korea following WWII, their presence will provide the foundation to build a modern indigenous armed forces and eventually a modern government. What will happen if the US successfully transitions Iraq and Afghanistan into free democracies in the same manner as, say, Korea and Malaysia? Will the transformation of the US armed forces to win in Iraq and Afghanistan provide the capability to execute the neocon policy?

The question then becomes, would the nation have the political will to ever undertake an operation like Iraq again? The issue might not be what risks would future American leaders take, but what risks would future despotic leaders take.