Military Transformation and the Impact on National Policies

This link points to an interesting article by Major General Alan Peck attempting to describe the USAF's role in COIN warfare. The power in the article emanates more from its existence than from its contents. The essay is not particularly enlightening and appears to be loaded with buzzwords, acronyms, and descriptions of air force capabilities. But the fact that the USAF is actively trying to understand and mold itself to make meaningful contributions to COIN operations is an example of how the US armed forces are transitioning from the cold war to COIN war. General Peck's essay along with other debates underway in the Army exemplify the learning and dynamic nature of the US armed forces.

This morphing of the US's armed forces is intriguing when studied in light of the original neoconservative policy that led to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Recall that the original neocon positioned argued that if the US used its overwhelming military power to overthrow a few despotic rulers, other dictators would fall in line and move toward democracy. Following Saddam's capture, Kadafi's surrender of the Lybian nuclear program provided partial credence that this strategy was affective--that is, until Iraq's slide into a guerrilla and near-civil war, which convinced many observers the US is not capable of executing this strategy. The lightning victory over Saddam's armies indicated the US forces were easily capable of destroying a dictator's conventional forces, but the painful and disastrous guerrilla war that followed proved US occupation and nation building incompetence .

After the Vietnam War defeat, the US successfully avoided major military engagements other than the Cold War until the first Gulf War. The sixteen years between the two wars saw the US briefly involved in only a few military contests and American leaders appeared unwilling to sustain losses. Reagan's withdrawal from Beirut suggested that the US would retreat in the face of a quagmire, which is not a surprise considering the Vietnam experience--and Reagan was a hawk.

All the Democratic Presidential candidates have stated they will not permanently keep troops in Iraq. The top three Republican candidates have always expressed their intent to keep troops in Iraq for years to come. With the military victory in Iraq progressing and becoming more obvious though, the Presidential candidates are expressing a willingness to keep US forces in Iraq for a longer period of time. Hillary has been clearer in her commitment to remain in Iraq for the foreseeable future as ABC reported:

"I think we have remaining vital national security interests in Iraq” she said, which require the continued presence of American troops.

Like a true politician Hillary states a slightly different policy on her website:

Hillary opposes permanent bases in Iraq. She believes we may need a vastly reduced residual force to train Iraqi troops, provide logistical support, and conduct counter terrorism operations. But that is not a permanent force, and she has been clear that she does not plan a permanent occupation.

So it is likely the next President will keep troops permanently in Iraq. Much like American troops in Europe and Korea following WWII, their presence will provide the foundation to build a modern indigenous armed forces and eventually a modern government. What will happen if the US successfully transitions Iraq and Afghanistan into free democracies in the same manner as, say, Korea and Malaysia? Will the transformation of the US armed forces to win in Iraq and Afghanistan provide the capability to execute the neocon policy?

The question then becomes, would the nation have the political will to ever undertake an operation like Iraq again? The issue might not be what risks would future American leaders take, but what risks would future despotic leaders take.