Iran is Gay Free!

When confronted about a question on Iran executing homosexuals, Ahmadinejad response was... well... I think he should speak for himself.

"In Iran we don't have homosexuals like in your country," Ahmadinejad said to howls and boos among the Columbia University audience.

"In Iran we do not have this phenomenon, I don't know who has told you that we have it," he said.

Ahmadinejad was challenged during his appearance on Amnesty International figures that suggested that 200 people had been executed in Iran so far this year, among them homosexuals.

The entire article

He might not have a bright future as the president of Iran, but maybe the Republicans could give him a PR gig here in the states? Lord knows that they could use all the help they can get.

Post-General Patraeus

Now that General Patraeus and Ambassador Crocker have delivered their assessments of the Iraqi war situation, I feel compelled, in the face of the noisy and rancorous public discourse, to add to the din. My motivations are driven primarily by the difference that I see between my views and the cacophony of other commentators. I have not read or heard of any opinion similar to mine. And since the Belcher Blog is designed to capture the ideas and views of participants at the time of the events, without the benefits of hindsight and history, I will expose my thoughts and make predictions about the future.

Before I begin, I recognize the dangerous territory that I am about to enter. Using historical and current events to predict the future is precarious and, as Nassim Taleb warned in the Black Swan, should be avoided (see my August 9, 2007 post Posts from the Past). Furthermore, I recognize that I have a bias toward victory. There is no doubt that my research and forecasts suffer from confirmation bias. With that in mind, I will qualify my predictions; these are the course of events that I see occurring provided no black swan events occur.

I will start with a parallel in history.

I feel that we are witnessing a substantial military victory comparable to the breakout of Allied forces from the Normandy peninsula in operation Cobra. Though Hitler’s National Socialist Germany was vastly more dangerous than Bin Ladin’s Islamic revolution—evident in the dramatic differences in lives lost—the relative significance of the two events appear similar to me. In the case of Cobra, Allied forces had fought a series of critical battles and amassed enough forces to break out of the difficult terrain blocking the Normandy peninsula. Following Cobra, the German Army in France would be encircled, captured, and its remnants driven back to the Siegfried line. The surviving German forces were barely able to mount a desperate yet doomed counterattack in the Battle of the Bulge five months later.

At this time in Iraq, the American “Surge” forces have arrived, deployed into key neighborhoods in Baghdad, and launched a series of offensive operations in the suburbs and rural communities surrounding the capitol. Army tactics changed as they moved from traditional warfare to counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare practices. At the same time, the Marines have managed an unexpected and surprising victory in al Anbar province by convincing key tribal leaders to abandon support for al Qaeda and to support the national government instead. Iraqi national army forces and local police are fully engaged in the effort and providing important combat forces despite their unsteady performance earlier in the war.

General Patraeus substantiated his position that the Surge was a success with ample charts and graphs showing quantifiable evidence of improvement. Various commentators either supported or challenged his data, or pointed the weak progress on part of the central civilian government as proof that his assessment was wrong. My intent is not to go through the numbers, but to point to some general patterns in the events that give rise to evidence of an emerging victory.

First, my impression that victory is at hand is the “Tribal Awakening”. This massed switching of sides by Sunni irregular forces in al Anbar province, once the site of the fiercest battles in the war, is clearly a victory for the Coalition forces. This change of events was only possible because the Marines, despite gleeful reports by some in the mass media of atrocities, fought a well executed counterinsurgency war against Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). In the end, the tribal leaders recognized that they were better off supporting the national government and the Coalition forces than supporting AQI. This was only possible because the Marines clearly understood and properly executed effective counterinsurgency warfare tactics. At the same time it appears that AQI failed to follow some of Mao’s most fundamental practices and principles and alienated the population.

Defeat of the AQI in predominately Sunni regions will interrupt the cycle of violence that led many observers to believe a sectarian civil war was underway. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi initiated the cycle by attacking Shia religions targets, which, in turn, resulted in retaliation against Sunni targets by Shia militia. The number two leader of Al Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, wrote a letter to al-Zarqawi in July 2005 warning him not to undertake attacks against fellow Muslims (the letter was intercepted by Coalition forces and an exerpt is at the end of this post). As AQI is forced out of their current sanctuaries by Coalition forces and the unfriendly Sunni population, they will become more vulnerable. The Shia regions will prove unsafe for AQI. Once AQI is defeated, then the cycle of violence will diminish and likelihood of a sectarian civil war abated.

Many observers of the War in Iraq do not understand the effectiveness of proper counterinsurgency warfare tactics. US military leaders worked desperately hard to bring these tactics to their regular forces. I listened to Lt. Col Nagl interviewed on Book Notes where he described the creation and deployment of the COIN manual to US forces, which arrived in 2006. Modern Western forces have successfully won COIN wars in recent history: in Malaysia in the 1950s and against the Viet Cong in the late 1960's. The patterns of operations are very similar.

Creation of a national government: Without a national government, the citizens of the country will find it difficult to form an allegiance with groups other than the insurgent groups. It is important that the government is not seen as corrupt and unjust. The national government needs to provide a rallying point for the population. In Iraq the rallying point might be the idea of a unified, yet diverse, Arab country (surveys report that 75% of Iraqis wish Iraq to remain a single nation-state).

Leveraging of local sources of power. In Vietnam this was the village and in Malaysia it was the Chinese labor camps. In Iraq it is the tribe and the “Awaking of the Tribes” in al Anbar supports this concept.

Creation of national security forces. Civilians are more likely to support the national government if security is provided by trustworthy and friendly local forces. Besides, foriegn nations cannot provide enough troops to meet the citizen to security personnel needed to protect the population.

Focus on the safety of the civilian population. The key to successful COIN is to convince individuals that their situation is improved by allying with the national government rather than with the insurgents. Insurgents need to intimidate civilians to some degree if they wish to remain safely anonymous within the population. So the movement of Coalition forces from the large, well protected main bases into the streets provides the protection that convinces the population that the national government has their safety in mind.

Absorption of militias into regular security forces. This allows the national government to influence and contain militia action and to install new leadership into these groups. It also sets the flow of pay and money up from local sources to the national government.

Successful efforts to improve the well-being of civilian population. Projects funded by the national government that effectively improve the lives of the general population demonstrate that the central government is better able to meet their needs than the insurgents.

Slowly these patterns of military operations will swing the population against Al Qaeda and make it dangerous for them to operate in Iraq. I am not predicting the complete collapse of AQI, but I do expect their level of operations to diminish substantially. A change in AQI tactics or targets will provide evidence that current Coalition operations are effective and that AQI needs a new strategy to survive. The question is how long will it take the leadership of AQI to adapt and for the change to become evident. How adaptive is AQI? Al-Zarqawi’s decision to attack Shia civilian targets and create a sectarian civil war at first appeared successful until Coalition forces changed tactics with a switch to COIN operations and focused on the protection of the civilian population.

What could undermine this promising picture of victory? Widespread corruption that leads the majority of individuals to believe the ruling government is unjust could be detrimental. I believe that for the foreseeable future the citizens of Iraq will accept current levels of corruptions in exchange for security and a sense of peace. I suspect Saddam immunized the population to corruption to some degree. Exposure to Western style governmental practices and the US armed forces should help move the government toward a more transparent and just organization. Watchful waiting by the international community and provincial surveillance should keep sectarian injustices by the central governmental to a minimum.

What black swan incident could change the course of events. I don’t think an assassination of Nouri al-Maliki, Muqtada al-Sadr, or Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani would lead to collapse of the increasingly positive Coalition situation. I believe none of these leaders are particularly critical to the success of the new democratic government the way that, say, Ghandi or Tutu was to movements in their countries. I think just the opposite is possible, that a leader could emerge from the current situation who could play a uniting role in the country the way these other great men did. This tumultuous period in Iraqi modern history, overcoming the autocratic regime of Saddam, dealing with the Coalition occupation, fighting against al-Qaeda, and forming of a modern government, is no doubt, creating impressive leadership somewhere in the sinews of competing forces. Is it possible that there is an Iraqi tribal leader, mayor, or military commander who has demonstrated ability to unit and lead diverse groups? Could this individual eventually come to power in some way? Israel, post-war Germany, and Meiji-period Japan persevered because of the outstanding leadership of a few key people who recognized the direction the nation had to go to become great powers again.

A massacre could be a devastating black swan event. Imagine a security force brutally killing nearly everyone in a village or neighborhood. It could be an irregular but sanctioned security force, like the 1920 Brigade that Michael Yon writes about, or a regular military unit in the Iraqi National Army. Either way, it could act as a divisive occurrence that weakens citizen support for the government.

But if a black swan event does not derail the current course of the war, an amazing victory is unfolding in Iraq. I wonder why the major media and their legions of commentators—note that I avoided the word “experts”—have not recognized it. If my observations and conclusions are accurate, the United States is defeating Al Qaeda in an Arab nation directly in the center of the Middle East.

The next observation indicating an acceptance of a Western style democracy in Iraq is a change in the view that the media expresses toward the Coalition, or a switch in the Arab press toward the Iraqi government. The first evidence that I observed was the following article from Al Jazeera. The article describes the response by the citizenry to the AQI killing of Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, the tribal leader responsible of the “Tribal Awakening”.

Thousands of people gathered in Ramadi on Friday to attend Abu Risha's funeral.

"We blame al-Qaeda and we are going to continue our fight and avenge his death," Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, brother of Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, said on Friday.

Ahmed Abu Risha was elected the new leader of the Anbar Salvation Conference just hours after his brother's killing.

Pallbearers carried Abdul Sattar Abu Risha's body from Ramadi to the cemetery 10km outside the city, while the funeral procession shouted "revenge, revenge on al-Qaeda."

Others mourners chanted "there is no God but Allah and al-Qaeda is the enemy of Allah" and "Abdul Sattar is the pride of Ramadi".

Nuri al-Maliki, the Iraqi prime minister, was represented by Muwaffaq al-Rubaie, his national security adviser, who condemned the killing.

"It is a national Iraqi disaster. What Abu Risha did for Iraq, no single man has done in the country's history," al-Rubaie told the mourners gathered in the sheikh's house.

"We will support Anbar much more than before. Abu Risha is a national hero."

The primary voices arguing against an American victory are those that point to the poor progress made on the political side of the war. Ambassador Crocker responded to these criticisms by pointing out the Iraqi government is struggling with difficult decisions, such as the strength of the national government versus the provincial and city governments. He pointed to our own historical difficulties with this question. Most critics claim that the war cannot be won without a political victory. I, on the other hand, feel that political progress is not needed for a victory. I do feel, though, that a military victory is needed for political progress. Once the competing groups in Iraq realize that they cannot achieve their goals through violent means, they will be more inclined to politically negotiate in good faith. I would not be surprised that the current group of Iraqi politicians might not be able to make decent progress before the next election. Considering our own political situation, that would put them in the same place as our Congress.

It is unfortunate that humanity seems to lurch forward through violent conflicts. Though Bin Laden might have gotten his wish when he hoped for a conflict in the Middle East with the US, I doubt he anticipated that his warriors would loose in that contest.

Below is the portion of the letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri (number two Al Qaeda) to al-Zarqawi (AQI leader) in July 2005 that describes al-Zawahiri’s concerns about provoking a sectarian civil war.

E) We must repeat what we mentioned previously, that the majority of Muslims don't comprehend this and possibly could not even imagine it. For that reason, many of your Muslim admirers amongst the common folk are wondering about your attacks on the Shia. The sharpness of this questioning increases when the attacks are on one of their mosques, and it increases more when the attacks are on the mausoleum of Imam Ali Bin Abi Talib, may God honor him. My opinion is that this matter won't be acceptable to the Muslim populace however much you have tried to explain it, and aversion to this will continue.

Indeed, questions will circulate among mujahedeen circles and their opinion makers about the correctness of this conflict with the Shia at this time. Is it something that is unavoidable? Or, is it something can be put off until the force of the mujahed movement in Iraq gets stronger? And if some of the operations were necessary for self-defense, were all of the operations necessary? Or, were there some operations that weren't called for? And is the opening of another front now in addition to the front against the Americans and the government a wise decision? Or, does this conflict with the Shia lift the burden from the Americans by diverting the mujahedeen to the Shia, while the Americans continue to control matters from afar? And if the attacks on Shia leaders were necessary to put a stop to their plans, then why were there attacks on ordinary Shia? Won't this lead to reinforcing false ideas in their minds, even as it is incumbent on us to preach the call of Islam to them and explain and communicate to guide them to the truth? And can the mujahedeen kill all of the Shia in Iraq? Has any Islamic state in history ever tried that? And why kill
ordinary Shia considering that they are forgiven because of their ignorance? And
what loss will befall us if we did not attack the Shia? And do the brothers forget that we have more than one hundred prisoners - many of whom are from the leadership who are wanted in their countries - in the custody of the Iranians? And even if we attack the Shia out of necessity, then why do you announce this matter and make it public, which compels the Iranians to take counter measures? And do the brothers forget that both we and the Iranians need to refrain from harming each other at this time in which the Americans are targeting us?

Review: America's Secret War : Inside the Hidden Worldwide truggle Between America and Its Enemies

I finished up listening to America’s Secret War today. I honestly can’t offer a complete review because the audio format that I used left a huge gaping hole in my take on the book. Notably, I don’t know what sort of foot notes the author was using. This is a pretty crucial point, especially as you reach the later points in the book. It will become clear why as I give my review on America’s Secret War, by George Friedman.

Consider this book a history lesson. The history lesson starts some time around the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and runs right up to the date that the book was published (late 2004). What sets this book’s perspective apart from other perspectives is that finds intention and motive in everything. Every single news headline is really a feint or thrust by one power or another, motives are rarely what they seem, everyone practices realpolitik, and conspiracies are abound. If there is a weakness to the book, it is that at times the voice that describes the thinking of all sides speaks with such authority as to leave one skeptical of the analysis. It is one thing to state potential motivations and for a particular action, but to claim in a certain and authoritative voice that one nation or group did something for one reason or another comes off as overconfident at times. The story that is told is coherent and makes sense in the view of the world Friedman has taken, but buying Friedman’s world view might be hard for some to do (and I include myself in this camp). Footnotes might help resolve some of my skepticism, but some assertions are so bold that there is little that could shake my skepticism.

That said, don’t let Friedman’s apparent overconfidence that he understands that truth of the world dissuade you entirely from this book. For every over confident assertion of one entity’s motives, there is another very believable and plausible perspective brought to the table that is enlightening. In particular, Friedman picks apart al-Qaeda’s origins and motivations and offers up a plausible strategy that al-Qaeda could be following that expands well beyond Giuliani’s “they hate our freedom” analysis. Not only does Friedman offer up a compelling description of al-Qaeda and its motives, he offers up evidence to support his claims. Unlike later in the book when he talks about post 9/11 politicking, his pre-9/11 assertions seem sound and mostly supported.

If there is one real failing of this book, beyond the questionable authoritative assertions of each parties actions, it is that Friedman starts to lose the thread of his original claim near the end of the book. Friedman originally makes the compelling claims that al-Qaeda had a goal and a plan to enact a pan-Islamic caliphate, and that provoking the Americans was al-Qaeda’s attempt to unite the Islamic world in revolution. Friedman’s analysis fails near the end of the book when he devolves from talking about al-Qaeda’s motives and strategy, to focusing on al-Qaeda’s tactics. He seems to imply that al-Qaeda wants to launch future attacks on the US, but fails to explain how this would advance al-Qaeda’s cause. He starts to make the same mistake that most people make and focus on tactics instead of grand overarching goals and strategy. The book begs for an analysis of al-Qaeda’s post 9/11 actions in the context of their overarching goals, but for the most part fails to do so. That said, a wise reader can easily come to his own conclusions.

I do suggest reading this book, but qualify this recommendation suggesting that you read it with skepticism. If nothing else, the world view presented in this book is unique and coherent, if impossible to prove at times. Beyond the interesting world view, the book offers up some very solid analysis of al-Qaeda’s rise and goals pre-9/11. The description of the American foreign policy maneuvers taken in response to 9/11 might leave you skeptical, but it is, if nothing else, entertaining and perhaps even plausible.

I Have To Read This Book!

Wow! I must read this book. Jon's review was very intriguing and has pricked my interest. Understanding the motivation of one's opponent is key to winning. As the ancient Sun Tzu said in the Art of War:

So it is said that if you know your enemies and know yourself, you will win a hundred times in a hundred battles.

If you only know yourself, but not your opponent, you win one and lose the next.

If you do not know yourself or your enemy, you will always lose.

I am curious--is the reason that Al Qaeda has not attacked the US at home is that it would strengthen our resolve to continue the fight in Iraq? After reading Jon's review of the book, it appears that the opponents to the war and the "bring the troops home now" crowd are actually playing into Al Qaeda's goals.

Terrorism for the Sane

I am currently reading (well, actually listening too) a book called “America's Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle Between America and Its Enemies”. The book details the origins of al-Qaeda, the roots of the Taliban, the lead up to 9/11, and tries to give explanations and motivations behind each faction’s actions. There are a lot of points that could be discussed in reference to the book, but perhaps the most profound for me was the dissection of al-Qaeda’s motives.

There is a fundamental question that one needs to ask when pondering the motivations behind al-Qaeda’s actions is; are all al-Qaeda’s actions rational? Does al-Qaeda have a goal that it is trying to achieve in a rational way? Put another way, is al-Qaeda acting more like Chinese Maoist rebels, or more like Timothy McVeigh. Maoist rebels had a goal and used rational means to achieve it. Timothy McVeigh, while certainly having a goal, was completely delusional to think that blowing up the Oklahoma City building was going to achieve his ends. This is an important question, as it frames how to deal with al-Qaeda. Handling a religious suicide cult is much different from handling an organization trying to achieve its goal in a rational way.

George Friedman, author of America’s Secret War, argues that al-Qaeda is a rational organization with an achievable goal. Friedman categorically rejects simplistic “they hate our freedom” and “they want to make use Muslims” arguments. Instead, he argues that al-Qaeda wants to achieve a united Islamist caliphate that spans across the entire Islamic world. He argues that for al-Qaeda, the failure of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a defining moment. Al-Qaeda looked upon the Soviet defeat and thought that they saw a strategy for rebuilding and Islamic empire.

The Soviets poured hundreds of thousands of men into the blood bath of Afghanistan and were resoundingly defeated. A handful of poorly armed but highly motivated rebels were able to defeat the largest military in the world on its own border. To al-Qaeda, this was proof enough that force of will alone could expel foreign influences, topple corrupt and secular Islamic governments, and beat back overseas interventions.

Al-Qaeda’s rational goal with 9/11, according to Friedman, was to provoke the Americans into involving themselves militarily in multiple Islamic nations. The goal was two fold. First, al-Qaeda wanted unite the Islamic world by provoking the Americans into invading Islamic nations. It was al-Qaeda’s belief, that if the Americans were seen to be crusading against Islamic nations, the long victimized feeling people of the Islamic world would unite to defeat a common foe. Al-Qaeda’s second goal in provoking the Americans was to spawn an American defeat. It was al-Qaeda’s belief that the Islamic world felt impotent against the western world, and that this feeling of impotence is what kept them from striking forward and rebuilding the Islamic empire. By provoking the Americans into Soviet Afghanistan style defeat, al-Qaeda hoped to show the Islamic world the impotence of the Americans, and by extension the impotence of the governments that the Americans supported.

Al-Qaeda than has been thwarted both by their miscalculations and the active steps taken by the Americans. The invasion of Afghanistan in particular with its ‘light’ footprint never became the blood bath that al-Qaeda had hoped for. The pan Islamic uprising never occurred as either the governments of Islamic nations showed themselves to be more stable than al-Qaeda anticipated, or their citizens less enraged by American actions than they had hoped.

Even Iraq, which certainly still could become the “proof” of American impotence, has turned out to be far less than al-Qaeda had hoped. Instead of an Islamic uprising against the Americans, we instead see sectarian strife that has as much to do with inter-Islamic disunity than it has to do with resistance to American occupation.

Regardless if Friedman’s analysis is correct, his argument underlined for me that we spend very little time trying to actually understand al-Qaeda’s motives and instead rely on policy debate that revolves around cheap clichés like “they hate our freedom”. Al-Qaeda needs to be viewed as an organization that is rational and does things for rational reasons. Perhaps we might be better served to view al-Qaeda as being more like Maoist rebels with rational means and ends, than a crazy suicide cult that can’t be blocked (short of killing all its members) because it has no rational goal or method of achieving it.

Enjoy but Beware

Regression is an impressive analytical technique that works well where natural laws reliability and consistently influences the topic under study. In my field of engineering, regression analysis and their resulting models are phenomenally successful in analyzing and predicting outcomes. We use regression and models to automatically target processes and to uncover problems. We have recently worked with some supplier firms that will take all the data and measurements collected during the production processes to create self-correcting models that would keep product in spec.

I feel, though, that the technique is over used in financial markets. Armies of statisticians and economist have worked to create predictive models to explain markets, all to no avail. Certainly they have been lured by stories of models that can predict Supreme Court decisions. Talib, the author of Black Swan and Fooled by Randomness, has been very critical of regression analysis on social science topics. Any enthusiast of regression must read his book to understand the limitations of the technique.

But because you work in the physicals science and engineering fields, thoroughly learn the techniques and enjoy the fruits of prediction. To be the best in one’s field, though, take the time to try to explain the fundamental science principles that influence the outcome and give the models validity.

Man Vs Regression

I have been slinking my way through a new book, Super Crunchers. While the book itself has not sent down any truly illuminating beams of light from the heavens for me, it has brought to illumination a few interesting tidbits.

The basic premise is that statistical experimentation and data mining represents a massive leap in our ability to predict. For anyone already knows a thing or two about regressions and how they are used, the book weaves its way through some predictable examples of statistically driven models outdoing the best judgment of experts. Where the book really starts to shine is when it puts the light on some more unusual cases of data crunching that resulted in superior predictive results.

One of the more notable examples given is when a simple multivariate regression taking into account just six factors was able to out predict a team of 80+ political science and law experts when deciding how the Supreme Court would vote on various cases. To add insult to injury, the experts only gave their opinion when it dealt with the field that they were working in. A simple formula was able to out predict a small army of experts in what most would consider to be a very humanistic field.

This "Regression Vs The Law and Political Experts" example is not an isolated incident. In a survey of some 120+ academic studies built around experts competing with a multivariate regression over a vast range of topics, it was found that in only 8 cases did the experts defeat the regression.

As a user of regression analysis, this has got me thinking about where I can apply this sort of statistical thinking that reaches beyond the limited engineering optimization experiments that I normally engage in. One example brought up in Super Crunchers of particular interest to me was when a statistician with minimal knowledge of businesses put his multi-variate regression up against expert buyers for a particular company. He found that his regression was vastly superior in predicting if and when an order would be filled, and if it would come in on budget. While I have little desire (yet) to look at how the company I work for, Ballard, does its buying, it does call to question if other non-engineering aspects of my job might not be served by a regression analysis.

Most notably, I wonder if projecting project completion times might not benefit from the cold and object analysis that a statistical approach can bring. If there is one theme that Super Crunchers brings up constantly, it is that humans tend to make poorer decisions when presented with more variables and more emotional attachment. Something like project projection times fits both conditions for begging for poor human judgment. That isn't to say that human judgment needs to be removed, just that predicative capability might be improved if human judgment is just one variable to consider when making a prediction, instead of being the only variable. By letting human judgment be a factor in a regression, you can take into account factors that might be over look, while at the same time leaving the final decision out of human hands.

Super Crunchers has not exactly brought me any new and profound enlightenment, but it has opened my eyes a little to both the accuracy of a statical evidence based approach and to the breadth of areas it can be used in.